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Abstract

The gender gap is a political phenomenon that has been observed in the electorate since the
election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, with women being more Democratic and liberal than men.
Many studies have examined its existence among the white public, but little has been done to
document its presence among blacks. This study examines the gender gap among whites and
blacks and compares the results in order to see if there is a gender gap that exists among blacks
and if it is similar to that for whites. Bivariate and multivariate analyses conducted for both
blacks and whites find that the documented gender gap among whites is more pervasive than that
for blacks, largely because blacks are more united in their Democratic partisanship and liberal
attitudes. However, there are also significant gender differences among blacks that usually are
similar to and at times different from those among whites.
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Chapter1: Introduction and Literature Review

Introduction
The gender gap is an often discussed topic in the field of political science. The election of
Ronald Reagan as president in 1980 marked a turning point in history, as it was at this time the
gender gap was first noticed among researchers, with women tending to vote significantly more
Democratic than men. Successive years of elections and survey research data have shown that
this is not a passing fad, but something that appears to have its roots in the changing dynamics of
women’s place in the world. Women are now more likely than men to be Democrats and hold
liberal positions on a variety of issues. There have been several attempts to document and
explain the causes of the gender gap; however, none have fully described this phenomenon to a
satisfactory degree. The explanations that have been posited look at and describe research that
has been conducted with mostly or totally white samples, thereby neglecting the potential gender
gap that may exist among minority groups. This study remedies that problem by taking a large
sample of blacks, comparing the findings for them with the findings for whites and finding that
while the gender gap among whites is more evident, there does exist a gender gap among blacks
on some issues.

Literature Review
Significance of the Gender Gap
The gender gap (typically understood as the partisan difference in voting behavior between
men and women) was not a feature of political commentary prior to Ronald Reagan’s election in
1980 (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Prior to the 1980 presidential election there was no
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significant gender gap observed in the electorate, although women tended to be, in contrast to the
current findings, slightly more likely to favor Republican candidates in the 1950s and 1960s
(Stetson 1997). Since then the term “gender gap” has primarily been used to refer to the growing
difference in voting behavior between men and women, particularly the higher propensity for
women to vote Democratic. Often this term is also used to refer to the higher proportion of
women that identify themselves as Democrats (Trevor 1999). It is also used to refer to women’s
more liberal views on a variety of social and political issues (Welch and Sigelman 1989).
Because issues of representation among citizens are so fundamental in a democracy, whether
men and women speak with different voices is a particularly important question when it comes to
politics (Schlozman et al. 1995). In addition, gender differences may take on additional
significance because of women’s rising levels of political participation (and women simply
constituting a larger pool of eligible voters) and because of the greater attention they may pay to
particular issues and government policies. As a result, even small gender differences in policy
choices may no longer be inconsequential, especially if they occur across a wide array of issues
around which coalitions can form (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986).
Historical Background
The potential importance of gender as a politically relevant category in the electorate was
almost completely ignored in the literature prior to the 1980s, when the gender gap was first
observed in the electorate (Mattei and Mattei 1998). Since these earlier days of survey research,
such differences were (or were thought to be) small and inconsequential. Survey data conducted
in the 1970s showed that women, as compared to men, tended to be less politically efficacious,
to be less politically interested, to have less political information, and to be less likely to vote
(Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz 1977). Men and women tended to exhibit similar aggregate patterns
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and trends in voting and political partisanship, although women tended to be less politically
active and interested in politics (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). It was said that women were less
politically expressive because the environment of the housewife or the menial sort of
employment available to most women did not encourage participation in politics or provide
stimulation to gather and discuss politically relevant information (Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz
1977). As such, survey research once seemed to demonstrate the existence of a disparity in
citizen participation with men more, and women less, likely to take part in political life
(Schlozman, Burns, and Verba 1994). Since then, however, disparities in education levels have
diminished and women now participate in the work force at a significantly higher level than in
earlier generations, all the while making great strides in most other socioeconomic correlates of
participation as well (Trevor 1999).
As the gender gap in terms of political participation has narrowed, a new type of a gender gap
has emerged in the area of political attitudes and beliefs. Public opinion surveys have found
women tending to take a more liberal stance than men on political issues (Day and Hadley 1997).
A study in which 20 issues were considered found that women were significantly more liberal
than men on 15 of these issues and the gaps were largest on support for spending to aid the
unemployed and on war and peace issues (Cook and Wilcox 1991). Another study similarly
concluded that the two largest contributors to the gender gap in approval of President Reagan
were the issues of defense spending and social welfare (Gilens 1988). Women have also been
found to be more supportive of regulatory activities, as women have shown more support for
speed limit controls, fines for people who do not wear seat belts, jail terms for drunk drivers, and
banning cigarette advertising and sales (Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). The greater liberal stance
of women on these issues is consistent with the notion that women are socialized to emphasize
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connectedness (Trevor 1999), and because of this they stress feeling at one with their
surroundings, peace, domestic tranquility, and safety for all.
Explanations for the Gender Gap
The discovery of a narrowing gender gap in terms of participation, and the newfound gender
gap with regard to political attitudes and beliefs, has led researchers to formulate and test many
theories and hypotheses to account for this new gap. While none have been successful at
thoroughly explaining the causes for the gender gap, each offers a piece of the puzzle. These
theories, while not mutually exclusive of each other, explain different facets that compose the
gender gap. These theories include childhood socialization, autonomy, feminist ideology,
different views of finances and the economy, and the attitude and salience hypotheses.
The attempt to connect socialization and childhood gender differences to participation has
occasionally drawn the attention of researchers (Trevor 1999). The socialization perspective
assumes that adult political attitudes are learned in childhood, whereby girls are encouraged to
engage in appropriate role-playing, which usually includes conformity, passivity, and concern
with domestic activities; and boys are encouraged to be leaders, to be aggressive, self-reliant, and
to display traits conducive to economic achievement (Tedin, Brady, and Vedlitz 1977). As a
result of these early socialization processes, lower participation levels among women were a
standard characteristic of the early years of survey research (Trevor 1999). Since these early
days, prior to the beginning of the second wave feminist movement in the 1960s, two processes
have been operating which have reduced this pattern of differences in political involvement
between men and women. The first has to do with the fact that increasing numbers of women
are entering the workforce, while at the same time, the gradual process of women’s “liberation,”
achieving particular momentum in the early 1970s, has stressed the fundamental equality of men
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and women (Andersen 1975). The general pattern now for many of these differences in
participation has been one of increasing similarity rather than difference between men and
women with each succeeding generation (Trevor 1999).
The increase in women’s educational level and participation in the workforce, along with the
growing acceptability of the women’s movement has led women to achieve independence from
men (Carroll 1988). Rising divorce rates since the 1960s, coupled with the increasing average
age of first marriage have led to an increase in divorced, single, and also widowed women who
may have very different material interests (and ultimately voting preferences) than those of
married women (Manza and Brooks 1998). Carroll’s autonomy explanation of the gender gap
stresses the importance of this newfound independence in allowing women to consider their
interests separate from those of men. She demonstrates this by showing that women who were
either economically (defined as well-educated and in professional or managerial occupations, or
single, divorced or separated, or widowed) and/or psychologically (defined as favoring
egalitarian relationships between the sexes) independent of men were significantly less likely to
vote for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and to approve of Reagan’s performance as president in 1982,
than were women who were dependent on men for either their economic security or
psychological well-being. It is this type of twofold independence that is said to enhance
receptivity to feminist ideas and to lead to the emergence of feminist ideology.
Having a feminist ideology has proved to be strongly related to political values, to basic
orientations, and ultimately to issue preferences (Conover 1988). It is further possible that being
a liberal and egalitarian may increase one’s chances of becoming a feminist, as the relationship
between feminism and values and policy preferences has been found to be reciprocal (Cook and
Wilcox 1991). Cook and Wilcox found this in their reexamination of Conover’s 1988 work.

5

They state that developing a feminist consciousness may lead to more egalitarian values and
policy preferences, but that feminists are also recruited among more liberal and egalitarian
women and men. The feminist ideology associated with modern gender role orientation may
also increase efficacy, by stressing that women can be competent in nontraditional areas such as
politics (Hughes and Peek 1986). This notion fits well with the evidence that the gender gap
came of age in the early 1980s, when those who grew up during the women’s rights movement
of the 1960s were first able to express their political opinions at the ballot box. Thus, feminist
consciousness increased to such a degree that by 1980, there was a noticeable and persistent gap
(Howell and Day 2000).
Financial and economic matters have also been found to have differential effects on men and
women. It has been found that men consistently use more economic evaluations than women
(Welch and Hibbing 1992). Men, but not women, often judge the administration’s party on the
basis of their family’s finances. This was the finding of a study of voting behavior in
presidential elections in the years, 1980-1992, in which it was reported that evaluations of
personal finances did not matter for women in all four elections, but did matter for men in three
of them, those in 1980, 1984, and 1992 (Chaney, Alvarez, and Nagler 1998). As these were the
three elections out of the four in which a president was up for re-election, this indicates that men
who felt their personal finances were getting worse blamed the incumbent. However, even more
than men, women do consider perceptions of the national economy in their voting decisions,
such that women are slightly more likely to vote sociotropically (Welch and Hibbing 1992).
This may be the case because of the internal socialization of traditional gender roles, where men
are taught to be the economic breadwinners of their families and women are taught to have
greater concern for others and the society at large.

6

In spite of the foregoing theories and hypotheses, it has yet to be fully explained how men and
women come to identify as partisans and select their preferred candidates for office. Two
hypotheses have been put forth to answer this question. The attitude hypothesis maintains that
the gender gap in voting and party identification results from differences in the underlying
political preferences of men and women, while the salience hypothesis suggests that, beyond
differences in underlying political attitudes, men and women weigh issues differently when
evaluating parties and candidates (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). This was found to be the case
in the idea of militarism, where the authors found no significant gender gap in their original
bivariate analysis, but later concluded that gender differences in the structure of thinking belied
men’s and women’s militarism after introducing a series of demographic and attitudinal variables
(Conover and Sapiro 1983). These authors found that identifying as a Republican increased
militarism among men, but not women, and that higher levels of education depress militarism
among women, but not men. In addition, having identical views on issues was found to impact
approval of President Reagan differently for men and women, particularly on issues having to do
with the military, foreign policy, and the environment (Gilens 1988). At different times, both
hypotheses appear to account for variations in the gender gap as it was noted that attitude
differences between men and women largely explained the gender gaps in party identification
and vote choice in 1992, while issue salience was a substantially larger component of the gender
gap in 1996 (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Thus, it appears as though the gender gap
encompasses more than just having dissimilar political attitudes; it also includes a different way
of using these attitudes to provide a basis for political action, while illustrating the fallacy of
assuming that what is normal behavior for men is normal for women too (Welch and Hibbing
1992).
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Race and the Gender Gap
The gender gap as previously discussed is based almost exclusively on observations of the
white electorate (Lien 1998), leaving a hole in academic circles as to whether and how a gender
gap might arise among blacks. Until recently most voting analysts have largely ignored
variations in the partisan preferences of blacks, viewing them for all practical purposes as
homogeneous (Welch and Foster 1992). As will be seen changes are occurring among the black
community that are beginning to foster differences of opinions among its members, as blacks
become more diverse like whites with regard to educational and income disparities. These things
may eventually surpass the importance of race in structuring blacks’ political attitudes and
become primary cleavages in their belief systems, thus causing various gaps among them
including a gender gap.
Race has arguably come to have a large influence on politics in the United States in the last
few decades (Weakliem 1987), since its rise from being a predominantly regional concern in the
pre-New Deal period (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In the years afterwards and particularly as
the Civil Rights movement began to acquire national attention, its influence on politics became
even greater. This occurred as the feelings among blacks were greatly affected by the political
and social events of the 1960s, such as the Civil Rights movement, the ghetto revolts, and the
Black Power movement (Welch and Combs 1985). As the Republican party was moving to the
right on race in 1964, the national Democratic party, pushed hard by the Civil Rights movement,
was moving to the left, and these differences between the parties have done nothing but harden
over the years (Kinder and Sanders 1996). As a result, the ideological differences between the
parties on racial issues have become much larger since the 1950s, and black voters have shifted
further towards the Democrats (Weakliem 1987). The dramatic switch in the positions of the
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parties expressed so vividly in the 1964 election served to induce predictable alterations in the
partisanship of American voters, both black and white (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Blacks still
remain staunchly loyal to the Democratic party (Tate 2003), with black Democrats being far less
likely to defect from the party in the polling booth by voting for Republican candidates than are
white Democrats (Lublin 2004).
It is a long-standing presumption in political sociology that social and demographic
characteristics structurally locate individuals in ways that expose them to particular political
influences, creating distinctive political interests and outlooks (Kingston and Finkel 1987).
Racial differences appear critical in understanding political behavior (Reese and Brown 1995).
Among blacks, group identity - a feeling of solidarity with ingroup members with whom one
habitually interacts, lives in proximity with, and shares a history with - is found to be notably
strong (Thornton and Mizuno 1999). Group solidarity is only one aspect of blacks’ social
attitudes, but it is especially important in shaping a variety of other attitudes and in influencing
behavior, with most black Americans saying that they feel some sense of solidarity with other
blacks (Bledsoe et al. 1995). Judged by the criterion that their fate is linked to the fate of fellow
blacks, a large majority of black Americans manifestly feel a sense of racial identification, with
approximately three quarters of them saying that what happens to blacks in the country as a
whole affects their lives (Sniderman and Piazza 2002). It is because of this racial unity among
the black population that race has emerged as a “single, profound line of cleavage” (Kinder and
Sanders 1996).
The racial divide is imposing, but there are serious disagreements within each group as well;
among blacks and whites alike, opinion is very far from monolithic (Kinder and Sanders 1996).
A potential indicator of cleavage within the black community may be the erosion of the “we”
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feeling among blacks that was so prevalent in the 1960s and the early 1970s (Welch and Combs
1985). The development of a more genuinely multiracial society is blurring the line between
black and white and the increasing income, and lifestyle differences between poor and middleclass blacks may undermine their sense of collective identity and fate (Bledsoe et al. 1995). It
would not be surprising if attitudes of blacks divided along income or educational lines, since
within the larger society, class is a major predictor of political attitudes and behavior (Welch and
Combs 1985). While it has been found that controlling for class differences, it is race, not class,
that is dividing contemporary American society over racial policy and that the racial divide in
political aspirations and demands is really racial (Kinder and Sanders 1996), there are reasons to
suspect that this may be changing.
The racial divide is not a mask for class differences; it is rooted in race itself, in differences of
history (Kinder and Sanders 1996). Kinder and Sanders even acknowledge that as blacks make
their way to the middle class, like other members of the middle class, they may come to
appreciate the virtue in conservative policies. There has indeed been speculation that the
growing economic gulf among segments of the black community would lead to increased
diversity of opinion; that upwardly mobile middle-class blacks would become more conservative
and attuned to economic interests different from those of those of the black lower classes (Welch
and Combs 1985). While such a increase in conservatism among blacks has not consistently
been found, blacks have begun to fracture along income and educational lines. Welch and
Combs (1985) found that those with more income and education were more liberal on spending
for education, and those with more education were also more liberal on spending for health care.
While not necessarily in the direction that would have been predicted from the given knowledge
on white public opinion, it is certainly the beginning of a split among blacks in the area of
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socioeconomic status. In addition, and more in line with previous research on whites, it was
found that blacks with higher incomes are 15.3% less likely than those with lower incomes to
support affirmative action, while those with more education are 16.6% more likely than those
with less education to support affirmative action (Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2003).
Because of increasing economic diversity blacks may be less supportive of black interests and
black candidates than in the past, thus causing one of the last truly cohesive voting blocs in the
United States to splinter (Bledsoe et al. 1995).
While black opinion may indeed splinter along the lines of socioeconomic status, it is also a
truism that race and gender are two of the main dimensions of social stratification in
contemporary American society (Kane 1992). Indeed, it has been found that since the 1980s,
women are more likely to self-identify as Democrats, vote Democratic in elections, and hold
more liberal views on a variety of social and political issues (Trevor 1999; Welch and Sigelman
1989). While these findings are based almost exclusively on observations of the white electorate
(Lien 1998), there are also reasons to expect that they might translate to the black community as
well. Feelings of racial solidarity have been found to connect blacks with one another on policy
issues, such as affirmative action and Food Stamps (Kinder and Sanders 1996). But it is also
known that black men and women differ in terms of their feelings of racial solidarity. Black men
were found to score higher on a racial solidarity scale than were black women; controlling for the
effects of the other variables in the model, the male-female differential was 1.4 points on the 024 scale (Bledsoe et al. 1995), a small, but nonetheless significant gender effect. It is also
thought that black women may form weaker racial identities than black men because they are
less likely to perceive themselves as victims of racial discrimination (Welch and Sigelman 1991).
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In addition to having less racial solidarity than black men, black women may be more likely
than white women to consider themselves feminist (Mansbridge and Tate 1992). Mansbridge
and Tate posit two reasons for this phenomenon. First, black women’s structural positions have
forced them into economic independence from and educational equality with black men. And
secondly, black men and women understand more clearly than whites what it is to be structurally
oppressed, and the need to work through a political movement to mitigate or end that oppression.
Gender consciousness is an awareness of one’s self as having certain gender characteristics and
an identification with others who occupy a similar position in the sex-gender structure (Chow
1987). Perhaps, it is greater income and education that allows black women to unite more with
white women in feminist causes, as the most politically active professional black women, along
with the most politically active professional white women, were most likely to support Anita Hill
during the Clarence Thomas nomination hearings (Mansbridge and Tate 1992).
However, race, gender, and class are neither additive nor parallel, but interactive forms of
oppression; they intersect in ways that create not simply more oppression for working-class
women of color but profoundly different oppressions for women of various races (Smith 1995).
Insofar as domestic service has been a primary source of employment for black women in the
United States, class and racial oppression in the workplace has been structured and experienced
as the exploitation of one group of women by another group of women (i.e., privileged white
women in relation to their domestic employees) (Smith 1995). In addition, gender-specific
strategies tend to be highly individualistic, in part because gender in the United States does not
create territorial communities of women that may be developed (Smith 1995), whereas blacks
who do live in territorial communities score higher on the racial solidarity scale than those who
do not (Bledsoe et al. 1995). A broader prospective is needed to understand the development of
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feminist consciousness among women of color who are subjected to cross-group pressures
(Chow 1987), as black women are, and who are often told to choose between race and gender
solidarity, and often feel they must choose race (Mansbridge and Tate 1992). The very character
of gender relations tends to mitigate the recognition of gender oppression and discourage the
development of a commensurate solidarity (Smith 1995).
The main theoretical perspectives that have been traditionally used to explain the gender gap
among whites can also be expected to pertain to blacks also, but in a more limited manner. The
socialization explanation that states that adult political attitudes are learned in childhood, may
not equally apply to blacks. Because more black children than white children grow up in a single
parent home, where the female is usually the head of the household, these children cannot be
expected to be socialized in the same way than children from two parent homes are. The single
parent household, usually run by the mother, exposes more children who are black to a strong
dominant female influence. In this way, female children may not learn traditional gender roles,
and instead lead to adult women who are themselves less traditional and more masculinized. In
the same way, male children, growing up with only a single mother’s influence, may themselves
become more feminized. It is because of this that the socialization perspective may apply less to
blacks and more to whites.
Carroll’s autonomy thesis, however, can be thought to lead to a greater divergence of opinion
among blacks than among whites, because of its basic tenet which states that women’s
independence from men is what is responsible for the gender gap. While white women achieve
their autonomy from white men primarily through their increasing success in the workforce,
black women who are also gaining on black men have additional things that lead to their
independence. In addition to their growing success in the workplace relative to men, as stated
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previously, there are a lot more black, single parent homes led by women than there are among
whites. In these situations, women increasingly have to rely on themselves, which can lead to
different opinions, from those of men. Similarly, because of the decreased marital rates for
blacks, black men also are left without a significant other, presumably a woman, whose influence
can liberalize their own attitudes, thus causing an increased gender gap among blacks than that
for whites.
Having a feminist ideology is believed to cause women to become more liberal than men, at
least among whites. Among blacks, however, this could prove to be a double-edged sword and
lead to conflicting expectations. While some black women are socialized differently from men,
and tend to be more independent from men than white women, which would tend to lead women
to have a feminist ideology, it is not clear that this ideology will cause black women to be more
liberal than black men. As previously mentioned black women tend to feel pulled in two
directions; towards other women because of their same femaleness, and also toward black men,
because of their same blackness. Black women who consider themselves feminists, may feel a
connection to black men because of their shared racial oppression, a connection that has not been
established among whites. As a result, while being feminists, these women may put more of
their emphasis on racial issues, uniting them with men, leading their feminist preferences to the
back burner.
Financial and economic matters can expected to affect both black women and men and white
women and men differently also. More often than women, men use economic evaluations in
coming to judgments about the world around them. This is expected to be the case because it is
often still the man’s role to be in the charge of the family’s finances. Because of this, they are
more aware of the financial situation of their families, and as a result, more likely to know when
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their financial situation is becoming better or worse, and when it is worse, to punish the
incumbent party, who they are likely to hold responsible. Women, on the other hand, are more
likely to use the national economy as their measuring stick as to how they perceive economic
conditions. Among blacks often times women tend to be increasingly in charge of such matters,
because of the smaller gender gap in earnings among blacks compared to whites, and also
because of their greater tendency to be single heads of household. In these respects it is expected
that black women will be more aware of their family’s finances, and more likely to blame those
who they deem to be responsible. As a result, based on this hypothesis, blacks should exhibit
less of a gender gap than whites.
The attitude hypothesis which states that the gender gap in voting and party identification
results from differences in the underlying political preferences of men and women can be
expected to affect both blacks and whites similarly. The reason behind this similarity is because
the route from which political attitudes travel to becoming full fledged identification with a
particular party and specific voting behavior is expected to be the same for both blacks and
whites. The key difference between the races is the path by which one forms these attitudes,
which the forgoing hypotheses describe. Such as the case for the salience hypothesis, which
assumes that men and women weigh issues differently when evaluating parties and candidates.
Again, the key difference is how one forms their political attitudes, not the way they translate
into evaluations of parties and candidates.
Inquiry into the black gender gap has only been investigated by a limited number of
researchers, as a result of the paucity of research and data on this topic and what little research
has been conducted has yielded conflicting findings. A number of studies have been conducted
that show that there is no gender gap among blacks. On the issue of military spending, there was
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found to be a lack of a gender gap among blacks, in contrast to the findings for whites (Welch
and Sigelman 1989). Welch and Sigelman suspect that this is due to the fact that blacks may
appreciate the routes toward upward mobility provided by the military for the postwar generation
of blacks and also because relative to their male counterparts, black women have been more
likely than white women to pursue military careers. Similarly, gender was not significantly
related to black primary participation. Black women were no more likely to be aware of the
primary, to participate, or to report that they usually voted in presidential primaries than black
men (Tate 1991). Nor was gender significantly related to vote choice in the 1984 presidential
election. Black men were just as likely to vote for the Democratic candidate, Walter Mondale, as
were black women, in contrast to the eight point gender gap that was found among whites
(Welch and Foster 1992). It has also been observed that few opinion differences existed between
black men and women on a series of issues ranging from military spending to social welfare
(Walton 1985). For the vast majority of blacks it is thought that race is no doubt a more salient
basis of political differentiation than gender (Welch and Sigelman 1989).
Other researchers, in contrast, have found a gender gap among blacks that at times differs
from the gap found among whites. Studying the registration data for the 1992 election cycle, it
was found that black women were 3.7 percent more likely to become registered than black men,
compared to only a 2.6 percent difference among whites, with white women being more likely to
become registered (Lien 1998), although this finding does not control for gender differences in
eligibility, the main one regarding felon disenfranchisement, which affect many more black men
than black women or whites in general (Uggen and Manza 2002) need to find the citation when I
am in Metairie sometime next week) Other research has found that in 1980, black women were
more likely than black men to vote for Jimmy Carter, while black men were more supportive of
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John Anderson (Welch and Sigelman 1989). In addition, it has been reported that when
controlling for age, education, income, and religion, contrary to the authors’ expectations, the
gender gap in party identification was somewhat larger for blacks than for whites, with women
more likely than men to call themselves Democrats (Welch and Sigelman 1992). On affirmative
action, an issue of primary concern to blacks, a gender gap was also found, with black men more
in favor than black women, the direct opposite of what was found for whites (Lien 1998). Also,
issues connected to civil rights or minorities rank higher among the issue priorities of black men
than black women (Schlozman el al. 1995). A gender gap among blacks was also found on
abortion attitudes, with black men significantly less supportive of legal abortion than black
women (Hall and Ferree 1986). The data sources for these studies included a variety of
techniques to increase the number of blacks sampled, such as using the General Social Survey’s
(GSS) 1982 and 1987 oversample of blacks, combining multiple years of black respondents
together, collecting original data through exit polls, and utilizing the 1992 Current Population
Survey, which had a large enough sample that many blacks were included.
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Chapter 2: Hypotheses and Data

Hypotheses
I hypothesize that there will be a gender gap among black Americans, as there are some
male/female differences that cross racial and ethnic lines, but it will not be as large as the gender
gap for white Americans. In the past, researchers have had only limited success in finding a
gender gap among blacks, lending credence to the notion that blacks are a distinct, unified racial
category. However, the breakdown of racial solidarity among blacks, particularly among black
women, and the increasing class and socioeconomic differences among blacks in general should
allow the black population to more closely mirror the white population and develop a similar,
although narrower, gender gap. Black women should therefore be more Democratic and liberal
than black men, as is the case among whites.
Methods and Data
Using data from both the 1996 American National Election Study (ANES)1 and the 1996
National Black Election Study (NBES)2, I will examine the gender gap separately for whites in
the NES and blacks in the NBES in order to see if the gender gap for blacks is similar to the one
already established in the literature for whites. This will be done with data from both 1996
surveys in order to capture the mood of the country during the same time period, and because
1996 was the last year in which such an extensive survey has been conducted among blacks. In
total there were 1544 white respondents in the ANES and 1216 black respondents in the NBES,
thus enabling such a detailed analysis of opinion to be conducted with large sample sizes.
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Employing dependent variables which have an obvious liberal-conservative tilt to them,
crosstabulations for both whites and blacks will be run separately to gain a general idea of the
percentage gap between men and women of both races on these issues. Following the
crosstabulations, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions will be run for those dependent
variables in which there are seven response categories, including guaranteed job and good
standard of living, government aid to blacks, the seven-point crime reduction scale, rating the
women’s movement, party identification, and ideology. Ordered Logit will be used for those
dependent variables with between three and five response categories, including death penalty,
defense spending, change in welfare policy, number of immigrants permitted to come to the
U.S., federal spending on food stamps, and laws to protect homosexuals from job discrimination.
Logit will be used for dichotomous dependent variables, including immigrant government
services, 1992 two-party presidential vote, and 1996 two-party presidential vote. All of these
dependent variables will be examined in both bivariate and multivariate analyses.
The main independent variable of interest is gender, with other variables hypothesized to
affect the selected dependent variables controlled for. These control variables include age,
income, religiosity, marital status, and education. Gender is measured as 0 = male, 1 = female.
Age is an interval variable that measures the respondent’s age. Income is an ordinal-level
variable, measuring family income before taxes in the year 1995 and ranging from 1 = least
income to 11 = most income. Religiosity is an ordinal variable, measuring frequency of
attendance at religious services and ranging from 1 = least often to 5 = most often. Marital status
is a dummy variable coded 0 = not married and 1 = married. Education is an ordinal variable
measuring highest grade of school or degree completed and ranging from 1 = least education to 7
= most education. Region is a dummy variable coded 0 = non-south and 1 = south, with south
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including the original 11 Confederate states, with the exception of Texas, plus Delaware,
Maryland, Oklahoma, West Virginia, and Washington D.C. South is not strictly inclusive of the
11 original Confederate states because of how region was coded by the ANES (See the Appendix
for exact question wording and more detailed coding information.)

20

Chapter 3: Bivariate Crosstabular Analysis

Bivariate Crosstabular Analysis
The gender gap is a political phenomenon that while having been observed over the past
twenty-five years, has yet to be fully explained and documented, particularly among minority
groups. The typical findings for whites are replicated here, as it has been found that women are
indeed more liberal than men; blacks, however, are relatively more united across gender lines. In
each issue area in which there was an observed gender gap among whites, it was the women who
were more liberal than men. White women were also more likely than men to vote Democratic,
and to self-identify as Democrats and as liberals. Blacks, being more liberal than whites on
every issue discussed, more leftist in the areas of party identification and ideology, and more
Democratic in their 1992 and 1996 presidential votes, had very few gender gaps. Indeed, the only
issues in which there were observed gender gaps among blacks were on the questions of party
identification, death penalty, and the number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. Black
women were more liberal on only two of these three issues: party identification and death
penalty. On the question of immigration, it was black men who were more liberal than black
women, showing a reversal of the usual pattern. These results indicate that previous research on
mainly white respondents describing women’s more liberal nature can only be applied to blacks
in a very limited number of instances.
In the area of party identification, blacks tend to be more Democratic than whites, as over
80% of blacks self-identify as Democrats, while fewer than 60% of whites do (see Table 1a). In
addition, both blacks and whites exhibit gender gaps, as women of both races tend to be more
Democratic than their male counterparts. Close to half of black men describe themselves as

21

strong Democrats, while slightly less than half of black women do, resulting in a five-point
gender gap. Whites also show the same pattern. While substantially fewer whites call themselves
strong Democrats, only 15% of men and 22% of women, among those who do there is also a
seven-point gender gap, with once again women more so inclined than men. At the Republican
end of the spectrum, there is virtually no gender gap among blacks, but there exists a gender gap
among whites. Men are four to five points more likely than women to identify with varying
degrees of Republicanism. The findings indicate that the primary area of cleavage among blacks
is in their differing levels of attachment to the Democratic party, with women more attached than
men, while among whites a different picture emerges. Among whites, the major cleavage and
resulting gender gap occurs because men and women belong to different parties, with most
women in the Democratic fold and men evenly divided between the parties.
TABLE 1a—Party Identification

Number of cases

Blacks
Men
Women
44%
49%
17
24
20
13
11
7
5
3
2
2
2
2
101%
100%
448
742

Whites
Men
Women
15%
22%
19
22
12
15
9
9
14
9
16
14
15
10
100%
101%
684
843

Tau C =
r=

-.089 (p = .004)
-.083 (p = .004)

-.134 (p = .000)
-.120 (p = .000)

Strong Democrat
Weak Democrat
Independent Democrat
Independent
Independent Republican
Weak Republican
Strong Republican

Since the 1960s ideology has become more correlated with party identification than in
previous decades, especially among whites. Indeed, a bivariate regression for each race shows
that ideology and party identification are more highly correlated among whites than among
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blacks. Because of this, blacks are considerably more likely than whites to place themselves in
the most liberal categories and are also more likely to call themselves extremely conservative
(see Table 1b). While liberalism is traditionally correlated with being a Democrat, both black
men and women are four times more likely than whites to call themselves extremely
conservative and even so remain steadfastly in the Democratic ranks and opposed to
conservative Republican presidential candidates. This is an interesting finding and may be a
result of blacks being more likely to interpret conservative as referring to social and religious
conservatism, rather than to racial and economic conservatism. These two factors, social and
religious conservatism, are known to drive blacks’ partisanship and vote choice. As a result,
blacks are similarly distributed along the ideological spectrum and therefore display no gender
gap. Whites, on the other hand, have few respondents in the two most extreme response
categories where negligible gender gaps are observed. The major gender differences are to be
found among the more intermediate categories. In the two intermediate liberal categories, there
is a combined eight-point gender gap between men and women, and in the moderate category,
there is a seven-point gender gap between men and women. In both cases women are more
likely than men to call themselves liberal or moderate. In the two intermediate conservative
categories there is a combined sixteen-point gender gap among men and women, with men more
likely than women to call themselves conservative.
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TABLE 1b—Ideology

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
19%
16%
8
14
17
15
11
11
19
25
12
9
14
11
100%
101%
434
720

Whites
Men
Women
1%
2%
8
11
11
16
27
34
25
15
25
19
3
3
100%
100%
568
628

Tau C =
r=

-.027 (p = .405)
-.025 (p = .402)

-.153 (p = .000)
-.127 (p = .000)

Extremely liberal
2
3
Moderate
5
6
Extremely conservative

In the 1992 presidential election (see Table 1c), between the incumbent Republican ticket of
George H. W. Bush and Dan Quayle and Democratic challengers Bill Clinton and Al Gore, in
the two-party results, almost half of all white respondents reported voting for the Republican
incumbents, while over 90% of all black respondents reported voting for the Democratic
challengers. Because blacks had so much unity in their support for the Clinton/Gore ticket, there
is no evidence of a gender gap in their vote choice. Whites, on the other hand, who were more
diverse in their vote choice, differed markedly along gender lines in their vote. Women were ten
points more likely than men to report voting for the Democratic ticket, while men were more
likely to support the outgoing Republican incumbents.
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TABLE 1c—1992 Presidential Vote

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
7%
6%
93
94
100%
100%
258
489

Whites
Men
Women
51%
41%
49
59
100%
100%
411
535

Tau C =
r=

.008 (p = .661)
.016 (p = .656)

.099 (p = .002)
.100 (p = .002)

Bush
Clinton

Bush
Clinton
Perot
Other
Don’t Know
Refused
Number of cases
Probability of Chi-Square

Blacks
Women
Men
6%
6%
78
86
6
2
2
1
2
3
6
3
100%
101%
308
534
.006

The 1996 presidential election saw incumbents Bill Clinton and Al Gore, running as the
Democratic ticket, winning re-election over Republican challengers Bob Dole and Jack Kemp.
Both blacks and whites reported voting in higher percentages for the Democratic ticket than they
had in 1992 (see Table 1d). As in 1992, in the two-party results, blacks did not have a significant
gender gap in their presidential vote choice; only 3% of black men and 2% of black women
reported voting for the Republican challengers. Whites, however, were more divided in their
support of the Democratic ticket. Majorities of both white men and women supported
Clinton/Gore, but women were more likely than men to report voting for the Democratic
incumbents, which as a result gave rise to the observed gender gap of twelve points, two points
larger than what had been seen in the 1992 presidential election.
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TABLE 1d—1996 Presidential Vote

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
97%
98%
3
2
100%
100%
188
368

Whites
Men
Women
52%
64%
48
36
100%
100%
424
501

Tau C =
r=

-.014 (p = .279)
-.051 (p = .232)

-.119 (p = .000)
-.121 (p = .000)

Clinton
Dole

Clinton
Dole
Perot
Other
Don’t Know/Refused
Number of cases
Probability of Chi-Square

Blacks
Women
Men
83%
90%
3
2
2
1
4
3
8
5
100%
101%
219
403
.131

In running the analysis for presidential vote in the years 1992 and 1996, a substantial gender
gap among blacks was observed among those who responded that they voted for the two major
party candidates. Response rates among black women were 67.3 percent and 49.8 percent in
1992 and 1996 respectively, while among black men the comparable rates were 59.0 percent and
43.7 percent. This leaves a response rate gender gap of 8.3 points for 1992 and 6.1 points for
1996. Because it was possible that this gap was due to the fact that only respondents who voted
for the two major party candidates were included, thus leaving out those who voted for other
candidates or did not know or refused to answer the question, a second analysis was conducted
only among blacks in order to try to explain this response rate gender gap.
This second analysis includes all response categories that were both included and omitted
from the previous analysis. The response rate gender gap still exists in spite of the addition of
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the previously omitted response categories, but is reduced by approximately one-quarter in each
instance; for 1992 it remains at 5.6 points, while for 1996 it remains at 4.7 points. While this
only accounts for one-quarter of the observed gender gap, it may be the case that other factors
are causing this gender gap that are not readily observed within the sample. Such factors as
men’s anti-system feelings, felon disenfranchisement, and perhaps the fact that there were
overall more women than men surveyed may also be contributing to this gap. The new analysis,
while not thoroughly explaining the variation in response rates in presidential voting does,
however, produce some interesting new findings that warrant further discussion.
Presidential voting has previously been found to not cause a gap among blacks, as nearly
equal percentages of women and men were found to support both the Democratic and
Republican presidential tickets. This originally was coded as a dichotomous variable thus
leaving out those who voted for another candidate or responded by saying that that did not know
who they voted for or refused to answer the question. With the addition of theses categories to
the analysis, however, it is the case that there is an observable gender gap among blacks in
presidential vote choice. In both 1992 and 1996, while there remains no significant gender gap
among blacks in their support for the Republican tickets of those years, there is a significant,
observable gender gap in support for the Democratic ticket in 1992 and one that approaches
significance in 1996. Women were eight and seven points more likely than men to vote for the
Democratic ticket in 1992 and 1996 respectively. Men who at first glance were just as likely to
vote Democratic as women now find themselves more dispersed among the additional
categories. Black men were more likely to have reported that they voted for Ross Perot, or some
other candidate, or to have refused to answer, than were black women. It is this that accounts for
some of the gender disparity in response rates among blacks.
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Women self-identify as Democrats more often than men among both races, with the larger
gender gap occurring among whites. This white gender gap occurs because of differences in the
partisan affiliation of men and women, while the black gender gap is primarily the results of men
and women’s differing levels of attachment to the Democratic party. In the instance of ideology,
black men and women are virtually indistinguishable from each other, while in contrast, the
findings for whites show that women are more liberal than men. This may perhaps be a result of
differing images that are conjured up between the races when asked about their ideological
makeup. It is possible that among blacks there is a unifying theme of both a preference for racial
liberalism and social conservatism, which ties them together, that is not a factor among whites,
who are guided by other images in their ideological composition. Also, in the area of two-party
presidential vote choice, among blacks, men and women appear at first glance to have very
similar candidate preferences. It is only when all of the response categories are included that a
gender gap among blacks in presidential vote is observed, with women more likely to vote
Democratic than men. Among whites, there is a definite gender gap in two-party presidential
vote choice as women are more likely than men to vote Democratic by a significant margin. It is
believed that if all response categories were included for whites as they were for blacks, this
gender gap would only increase, because of men’s greater tendency to vote for Ross Perot and
other candidates.
Women of both races have been found to be both more Democratic and more supportive of
Democratic candidates than their male counterparts. In the arena of issue positions a different
picture emerges, as a divergence of opinion is observed between blacks and whites. Blacks are
found to be more liberal than whites on each issue examined, and also to exhibit more unity in
their positions. Whites, on the other hand, are found to be generally more conservative, and
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exhibit more and larger gender gaps than do blacks, with white women being more liberal than
white men. This is to be expected among whites because white women generally are more
liberal than white men. However, among blacks, in spite of their similar ideological makeup, on
some issues there does exist a gender gap, as no one has a perfect issue constraint system within
themselves because one’s own personal experiences can cause a deviation from one’s stated
ideological preference.
Recent evidence suggests that the death penalty is unfairly and disproportionately applied to
blacks, and because of this we may expect to see racial and gender gaps in attitudes toward
capital punishment. Blacks are more likely than whites to hold liberal opinions in their
opposition to its continued legality and use (see Table 1e). Accordingly, there also exist
significant gender gaps among both races, with women more liberal than their male counterparts.
Among those who most strongly favor the use of the death penalty, there is a ten-point gender
gap among both blacks and whites, and in both cases it is the men who are most conservative and
in favor of the ultimate punishment. In contrast, among those who most strongly oppose the
death penalty, there is a fourteen-point gender gap among blacks, while there is a five-point
gender gap among whites; similarly in both cases, it is the women who are most liberal and
opposed to government-sanctioned murder. Therefore, the results are mixed, with a larger
gender gap among whites in regards to strongly favoring the death penalty, while the gender gap
is larger for blacks in opposing the death penalty, although it is the women of both races who
hold the more liberal attitudes.
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TABLE 1e—Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
48%
38%
12
12
19
17
20
34
99%
101%
265
467

Whites
Men
Women
68%
58%
14
19
8
10
9
14
99%
101%
616
727

Tau C =
r=

.140 (p = .000)
.132 (p = .000)

.109 (p = .000)
.104 (p = .000)

Favor strongly
Favor not strongly
Oppose not strongly
Oppose strongly

Defense spending is another area in which blacks are disproportionately affected, as higher
military spending tends to reduce available funds for domestic programs. Again blacks are the
more liberal of the two races under analysis (see Table 1f). Similar percentages of both blacks
and whites favor a decrease in defense spending, although white women slightly more so. The
main racial difference occurs in the categories of increasing spending, where more whites are
located, and keeping spending the same, where more blacks are located. While nearly identical
percentages of blacks can be found in each response category, indicating an inconsequential
gender gap, among whites there is a noteworthy gender gap, with white women more liberal than
white men. Men are nine points more likely to give the conservative response, by advocating an
increase in defense spending, while women are more evenly divided between keeping spending
the same and holding the liberal position of favoring a decrease. Women are three points more
likely than men to favor keeping spending the same and six points more likely to favor a
decrease.
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TABLE 1f—Attitudes Toward Defense Spending

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
19%
22%
54
52
27
26
100%
100%
299
515

Whites
Men
Women
39%
30%
32
35
29
35
100%
100%
636
699

Tau C =
r=

-.024 (p = .500)
-.024 (p = .494)

.099 (p = .001)
.090 (p = .001)

Increased
Kept the same
Decreased

Crime, an area affected by poor schools and high unemployment rates, in which those most
affected are black, is again a realm in which blacks are substantially more liberal than whites.
Black men and women both favor addressing social problems at nearly equal numbers.
However, among whites, while women are significantly more liberal than men (see Table 1g),
the results are not emphatically a confirmation of the hypothesis of women’s more liberal nature,
as only one of the two tests of statistical significance reaches the .05 threshold. Women are more
likely to be found in each of the three liberal response categories, addressing social problems,
while the conservative end of the scale has less clear results. In the two least conservative
positions, men are more likely to favor convicting criminals, while in the most conservative
response category there is actually a one-point gap with women more likely than men to most
strongly favor convicting criminals. The results indicate that women are both more likely to
have more polarized responses and simultaneously lean in the liberal direction, while men are
more inclined to be in the moderate to moderately conservative response categories.
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TABLE 1g—Seven Point Crime Reduction Scale

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
34%
29%
7
8
8
8
9
10
9
12
11
6
24
27
102%
99%
414
703

Whites
Men
Women
9%
13%
8
9
9
10
23
22
14
10
15
14
22
23
100%
101%
661
805

Tau C =
r=

.031 (p = .349)
.023 (p = .444)

-.054 (p = .065)
-.052 (p = .046)

Address social problems
2
3
4
5
6
Convict criminals

In attitudes toward the role of government in guaranteeing a job and good standard of living
for all, which hints at a racial tone as blacks are more likely to be unemployed and living below
the poverty line, the findings suggest that generally blacks are more liberal than whites, and that
white women are more liberal than white men (see Table 1h). Blacks do not exhibit a gender
gap, as black men and women are equally liberal on this issue, with both more liberal than
whites. Among whites, there is a five-point gender gap at each end of the scale, with women
more likely to agree with the liberal position of governmental intervention, and men more likely
to agree with the conservative position of letting people get ahead on their own. The more
moderate categories have less of a gender gap to them, but still lean in the direction of women
being more liberal than men.
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TABLE 1h—Guaranteed Job and Good Standard of Living

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
32%
30%
7
8
13
13
14
17
14
14
7
7
12
11
99%
100%
336
582

Whites
Men
Women
5%
10%
7
8
9
11
21
23
21
20
21
17
16
11
100%
100%
628
775

Tau C =
r=

.003 (p = .936)
.000 (p = .994)

-.144 (p = .000)
-.128 (p = .000)

Provide jobs
2
3
4
5
6
Get ahead on own

Another implicitly racial issue that many people believe benefits blacks more than whites
concerns whether a woman on welfare who has another child should be given an increase in her
welfare check. Some have proposed a change whereby a woman would not receive an increase
in her benefits for each additional child. Here, too, blacks take the more liberal route, being less
likely than whites to favor such a change (see Table 1i). While blacks are obviously more liberal
on this issue than whites, there are no significant gender gaps among either race. This is
surprising, as on most issues, while there has not been a significant gender gap among black
respondents, there has been one among white respondents.
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TABLE 1i—Welfare Reform

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
37%
39%
11
14
20
14
32
33
100%
100%
275
487

Whites
Men
Women
50%
54%
18
16
19
16
13
14
100%
100%
594
735

Tau C =
r=

-.020 (p = .594)
-.024 (p = .511)

-.028 (p = .335)
-.020 (p = .463)

Favor strongly
Favor not strongly
Oppose not strongly
Oppose strongly

The Food Stamps program is yet another program that is thought to benefit more blacks than
whites. As such attitudes toward Food Stamps funding repeat the familiar pattern, that blacks are
both more liberal and moderate than whites, who once again hold down the conservative fort,
particularly white men (see Table 1j). Blacks are ten points more likely than whites to give the
liberal response and favor an increase in such spending, and also approximately twenty points
more likely to give a moderate response, favoring keeping spending the same. Whites, on the
other hand, are more than twice as likely as blacks to favor a decrease in spending. There is no
gender gap among blacks. Among whites, there is a gender gap, as women are more likely to
favor both the liberal position of increasing spending, and the moderate position of keeping
spending the same. Men, in contrast, feel that spending should be decreased.
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TABLE 1j—Federal Spending on Food Stamps

Number of cases

Blacks
Men
Women
20%
22%
61
59
19
20
100%
101%
297
520

Whites
Men
Women
9%
12%
40
43
51
45
100%
100%
690
830

Tau C =
r=

-.012 (p = .718)
-.012 (p = .725)

-.075 (p = .005)
-.072 (p = .005)

Increased
Kept the same
Decreased

The same pattern is evident in attitudes toward government aid to blacks, an area obviously of
more concern to blacks than whites; blacks are considerably more liberal than whites, while only
among whites are women not so much more liberal, but rather than less conservative than men
(see Table 1k). Blacks do not exhibit a gender gap, presumably because this is an issue that
unites black men and women, as both are substantially more liberal than whites. However,
among whites, there is a gender gap with women more liberal than men. In the two most liberal
response categories, favoring government intervention, the percentage of women outnumbers
that of men by four points. In the three conservative response categories, believing that blacks
should help themselves, the percentage of men outnumbers that of women by a combined total of
ten points. The single largest gender gap is in the moderate response category, where there is a
six-point gap, as women are more likely than men to situate themselves here. So among whites,
not only are women more liberal than men, they are also more moderate than men, who mostly
oppose government aid to blacks.

35

TABLE 1k—Government Aid to Blacks

Help blacks
2
3
4
5
6
Blacks help themselves
Number of cases
Tau C =
r=

Blacks
Women
Men
32%
31%
6
7
13
13
12
17
15
15
7
6
15
12
100%
101%
337
576
-.026 (p = .485)
-.027 (p = .421)

Whites
Men
Women
3%
6%
3
4
10
9
20
26
22
19
22
17
20
18
100%
99%
642
769
-.097 (p = .001)
-.092 (p = .001)

Laws prohibiting discrimination in the workplace should have their most devoted fans in
those segments of the population that have faced discrimination in the past. In this instance
those laws are designed to protect homosexuals from such discrimination and do indeed find
their most ardent supporters among both blacks and white women, while the least discriminated
against group in American history, white men, are found to demonstrate the least support for
these laws (see Table 1l). Blacks are more likely than whites to be strongly liberal and strongly
favor such laws. A gender gap was not to be found among blacks, as black men and women feel
similarly on the issue, with more than half of men and women strongly in favor of such laws, a
number that is greater than among white respondents. As is the case with blacks, the most
common response category among whites is the most liberal position. Whites also are more
likely than blacks to choose one of the more moderate “not strongly” response categories,
indicating that whites’ sentiments about this issue are apparently not as strong as those blacks
have. In contrast to blacks, quite a strong gender gap was found among whites. Women are
more likely to hold the most liberal position and strongly favor job protection for gays. White
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men, on the other hand, are in the majority in each of the other three response categories,
showing their conservative streak relative to women once again.
TABLE 1l—Laws to Protect Homosexuals from Discrimination

Number of cases

Blacks
Men
Women
53%
54%
18
15
11
10
19
21
101%
100%
268
465

Whites
Men
Women
34%
45%
26
24
14
12
27
20
101%
101%
578
722

Tau C =
r=

.003 (p = .938)
.010 (p = .787)

-.128 (p = .000)
-.114 (p = .000)

Favor strongly
Favor not strongly
Oppose not strongly
Oppose strongly

The women’s movement should also count women and blacks among its biggest fans.
Perhaps because of the similarities between the women’s rights movement and the Civil Rights
movement, both blacks in general and white women show the most support for the women’s
movement (see Table 1m). Blacks show more support than whites for the women’s movement
and have an observed gender gap of ten points among those who most strongly support the
movement, with black women more in favor than black men. Among whites, there is a gender
gap of eleven points among those who most strongly support the movement, with women more
supportive than men. There is no gender gap to speak of among blacks at the low end of the
scale, indicating the most opposition to the movement. Whites, on the other hand, have a small
gender gap at the lowest ranges of support, with men more in opposition than women.
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TABLE 1m—Actual Feeling Thermometer Scores for the Women’s Movement
Feeling Thermometer Rating
81-100
61-80
41-60
21-40
0-20
Number of cases
Tau C =
r=

Blacks
Women
Men
25%
35%
33
30
33
25
5
5
4
5
100%
100%
286
501

Whites
Men
Women
18%
29%
24
23
41
35
12
10
6
4
101%
101%
605
743

.093 (p = .012)
.067 (p = .060)

.144 (p = .000)
.130 (p = .000)

Attitudes about the ideal number of immigrants that should be allowed into the United States,
which taps into respondents’ feelings toward groups that are different from themselves, show
blacks slightly more accepting of others than whites (see Table 1n). Blacks are more likely than
whites to be either extremely liberal or extremely conservative on this issue, while overall,
whites are more likely to favor the conservative position of a decrease in allowable immigrants.
In contrast to all previous findings documenting a gender gap among whites, where none exists
among blacks, here there is not a gender gap among whites, while there is a gender gap among
blacks that approaches the usual standard of statistical significance. While there is only a small
margin of gender differentiation here, it is striking because this gap runs opposite to what one
might expect. It is the black men rather than the black women, who by a combined six-point
margin, hold the more liberal opinion of favoring an increase in allowable immigrants, while the
women are a combined six points more conservative in calling for a decrease.
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TABLE 1n—Number of Immigrants to the U.S.

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
5%
2%
8
5
42
41
16
20
29
31
100%
99%
280
503

Whites
Men
Women
2%
2%
4
3
39
36
28
32
28
27
101%
100%
608
746

Tau C =
r=

.065 (p = .085)
.067 (p = .059)

.023 (p = .448)
.018 (p = .497)

Increased a lot
Increased a little
Kept the same
Decreased a little
Decreased a lot

Related to the number of immigrants that should be allowed into the United States, the
question of immigrant government services taps into what the U.S. government should do for
these immigrants once they arrive here. Consistent with the previous findings, blacks who are
generally already more inclined to accepting immigrants into the national community are also
slightly more likely than whites to favor allowing immigrants to immediately collect government
benefits (see Table 1o). However, overwhelming majorities of both races tend to give the more
conservative response by expressing the point of view that immigrants should have to wait at
least a year before being able to collect such benefits. Both blacks and whites are united on this
issue, with no significant gender gaps occurring among either race. This is, undoubtedly,
because men and women of both races recognize that the more that is spent on government
services for immigrants, the less money there is to support the programs that long-time residents
of the United States use.
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TABLE 1o—Immigrant Government Services

Number of cases

Blacks
Women
Men
19%
20%
81
80
100%
100%
279
497

Whites
Men
Women
12%
13%
88
87
100%
100%
605
742

Tau C =
r=

-.014 (p = .615)
-.018 (p = .618)

-.013 (p = .458)
-.020 (p = .460)

Now
In a year

Confirming the original hypothesis, the findings indicate that for both blacks and whites,
whenever there is a significant gender gap, it is the women who are more liberal than the men,
with only one exception: in their support for larger numbers of immigrants entering the U.S.
black men are more liberal than black women. The lack of a gender gap, for the most part,
among blacks shows that there is more consensus within the black community than there is in the
white community and that perhaps blacks are still united by their fight against the white man in
the area of civil rights and racism. While blacks of both genders are more liberal than their white
counterparts, black and white women are much more similar in their attitudes than black and
white men. Perhaps women are more united by the feminist movement than first thought.
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Chapter 4: Multivariate Analysis

Multivariate Analysis
Gender is not the only personal quality that could be influencing respondents’ political
attitudes. Several control variables are introduced in order to estimate the unique effects of
gender on the dependent variables. The control variables are age, income, religiosity, marital
status, education, and region. All of these are known to have effects on the various dependent
variables selected. It has been found that older age is associated with greater conservatism in the
population at large (Welch and Sigelman 1992; Hasenfeld and Rafferty 1989), although older
people have also been found to be more liberal on some issues and to vote more Democratic in
some elections (Binstock and Day 1996). People of higher socioeconomic status-indicated here
by income and education-tend to be more conservative (Welch and Sigelman 1992), and less
likely to support redistributive policies (Glynn et al. 1999), a staple of liberalism. Religiosity
also marks a difference in party preference (Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999), with those who are
the most religious more supportive of Republican candidates and generally more conservative.
Marital status, too, has an effect because when compared to single adults, married individuals
tend to be more conservative and more likely to be Republican (Weisberg 1987). It was also
found that the pro-Democratic influences associated with the never married also induced them
toward the liberal side in all predispositional domains examined (Miller and Shanks 1996).
Region is also included because it is an established fact that southern states are more
conservative than average (Erikson, McIver, and Wright 1987).
Building upon the results in the bivariate crosstabular analysis, this section seeks to assess
whether any of the previously observed gender gaps remain when relevant control variables are
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introduced: those that have been identified as influencing political attitudes. The findings here
indicate for the most part that the bivariate gender gaps found do stand the test of the added
controls and retain their significance with a few exceptions. Among whites, women are indeed
more liberal than are men on the issues where a gender gap survives. However, the bivariate
relationships showing that white women are more Democratic and are more likely to vote
Democratic melt away once controls are introduced. This indicates that it is not gender, per se,
that leads women in a Democratic direction, but rather other variables are producing this effect.
Among blacks the only gender gap that remains in the multivariate analysis is that for party
identification; black women remain more Democratic than black men when controlling for other
factors.
The bivariate results for party identification indicate that there are significant gender gaps
among both blacks and whites (see Table 2). Women of both races are more Democratic than
their male counterparts. The multivariate results show that the relationship between party
identification and gender for blacks is still upheld and retains its strength even with the
additional controls. The predicted mean for blacks on the partisan identification scale is 2.222
among men, while among women it is 1.981, when other variables are held at their means (see
Table 18), showing that the main difference among black men and women is not in their partisan
affiliation, but rather in their strength of attachment to the Democratic party. Age also has an
impact upon blacks’ partisan affiliation, as those who are older tend to be more Democratic than
those who are younger. The situation for whites differs markedly, however. While in the
bivariate
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TABLE 2-OLS Regression Coefficients for Republican Party Identification
Black

White

Bivariate Coefficient

-.239**
(.086)

-.501***
(.106)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0056
1204
.0055

.0137
1527
.0000

-.224*
(.094)

-.192
(.135)

Age

-.021***
(.003)

-.003
(.004)

Income

.003
(.020)

.116***
(.029)

Religiosity

.026
(.036)

.200***
(.056)

Married

-.069
(.100)

.149
(.157)

Education

-.010
(.034)

.129**
(.046)

South

-.140
(.090)

-.201
(.134)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.045
938
.0000

.078
983
.0000

Multivariate Model
Female

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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TABLE 18-Predicted Values and Predicted Probabilities Illustrating the Gender Gap
among Whites and Blacks*
Whites
Ideology
1= extremely liberal to
7= extremely conservative

Males
4.675

Females
4.323

Difference
.352

Death Penalty
favor strongly
favor not strongly
oppose not strongly
oppose strongly

.665
.163
.080
.092

.566
.194
.106
.134

.099
-.031
-.026
-.042

Defense Spending
increased
kept the same
decreased

.378
.357
.265

.290
.361
.349

.088
-.004
-.084

Seven Point Crime Reduction Scale
1= Address Social Problems to
7= Convict and Punish Criminals

4.693

4.393

.300

Job and Good Standard of Living
1= Government Provide Jobs to
7= Get Ahead on Own

4.747

4.418

.329

Laws to Protect Homosexuals
from Discrimination
favor strongly
favor not strongly
oppose not strongly
oppose strongly

.298
.246
.143
.313

.423
.250
.118
.209

-.125
-.004
.025
.104

Actual Feeling Thermometer Scores
for the Women’s Movement

60.008

62.908

-2.900

2.222

1.981

.241

Blacks
Party Identification
1= strong Democrat to
7= strong Republican
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Relative Feeling Thermometer Scores
for the Women’s Movement
*

.140

.224

-.084

Only the models that were significant and included significant gender gaps are presented

results, the relationship between party identification and gender is twice as large among whites
as it is for blacks, once controls are introduced, the relationship between gender and partisanship
becomes statistically insignificant for whites. Only income, religiosity, and education are
significant. Lower income and less education are positively associated with being Democratic
and these factors partially account for the observed gender gap. Religiosity, however, is
positively associated with being Republican and since women are more religious than men, this
cannot account for the observed gender gap.
While blacks continue to have a significant gender gap in their partisan affiliation, even when
controls are introduced, in the area of ideology there is no significant gender gap among them
(see Table 3). The gap that does exist among blacks falls along the lines of primarily education
and region, as those blacks who are least educated and live in the South tend to be the most
conservative. Whites have a gender gap that remains as strong in the multivariate results as it is
in the bivariate results, indicating that the controls do nothing to diminish the gender gap.
Women have a predicted mean of 4.323 on the 1-7 ideological scale, compared to men, whose
predicted mean is 4.675 when other variables are held at their means, showing that women are
more likely to be liberal than men are (see Table 18), a statistically significant, but small
difference. Education is a factor for whites just as it is for blacks, however it runs in the opposite
direction. Among whites, the most educated tend to be the most liberal, in contrast to previous
findings showing that those with more education lean in the conservative direction and the stated
findings
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TABLE 3-OLS Regression Coefficients for Conservative Ideology
Black
Bivariate Coefficient

Model
Insignificant

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

Multivariate Model
Female

White
-.351***
(.079)
.0153
1196
.0000

-.127
(.134)

-.352***
(.096)

Age

-.003
(.005)

.004
(.003)

Income

-.054a
(.028)

.036a
(.021)

Religiosity

.083
(.052)

.276***
(.040)

Married

.060
(.143)

.086
(.113)

Education

-.215***
(.049)

-.088**
(.033)

South

.371**
(.129)

-.020
(.096)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0471
920
.0000

.0896
789
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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for blacks. Religiosity is also a factor for whites, as those who are among the least religious tend
to be the most liberal. Neither of these factors account for the gender gap, however, since it is
women who are both more religious and less educated, relative to men.
Voting in the 1992 presidential election produces no significant gender gap among blacks in
either the bivariate or multivariate models (see Table 4). Blacks are pretty unified in their
selection of the Clinton/Gore ticket. The only significant result in the multivariate model for
blacks is marital status, whereby those who are married were more likely to vote Republican than
the unmarried. Approaching significance is income, whereby those who have higher incomes
were, oddly enough, among the most likely to vote Democratic. Among whites a gender gap is
observed in the bivariate analysis, but disappears into the land of insignificance once the controls
are introduced. The key variable that is responsible for the observed gender gap is income,
whereby those who are with higher incomes were among those who most supported the
Bush/Quayle Republican ticket. Also significant but not related to the gender gap is religiosity,
as the most religious also tended to vote Republican
The year 1996 saw the Clinton/Gore ticket up for re-election. Blacks once again have no
significant gender gap in either the bivariate or multivariate results (see Table 5). Indeed the
whole multivariate model is insignificant demonstrating the unity that blacks had in their vote
choice. Whites, on the other hand, exhibit a gender gap in the bivariate relationship, but once the
controls are introduced, the relationship disappears, as there are other factors responsible for the
gap. Income and education are the main players in this model, as those who earn the most
money and are the most educated are the ones who gave more support to the Republican party
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TABLE 4-Logit Coefficients for 1992 Presidential Vote for Clinton

Bivariate Coefficient

Black

White

Model
Insignificant

.406**
(.132)

Number of Cases
% Correctly Classified
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

Multivariate Model
Female

946
55.60
-2.632
.0021

.397
(.343)

.110
(.169)

Age

.024a
(.013)

-.007
(.005)

Income

.142a
(.079)

-.091*
(.037)

Religiosity

-.160
(.143)

-.245***
(.069)

Married

-.884*
(.359)

-.123
(.192)

Education

.018
(.132)

-.082
(.057)

South

.089
(.346)

.109
(.167)

Number of Cases
% Correctly Classified
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

631
93.50
32.196
.0737

646
61.30
10.358
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: See appendix for coding scheme.Note: The positive BIC’s indicate a poor fit of the model
as a result of the inclusion of insignificant control variables.

48

TABLE 5-Logit Coefficients for 1996 Presidential Vote for Dole
Black
Bivariate Coefficient

Model
Insignificant

Number of Cases
% Correctly Classified
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

Multivariate Model
Female

White
-.495***
(.134)
925
58.16
-6.817
.0002

Model
Insignificant

-.226
(.171)

Age

.005
(.005)

Income

.131***
(.039)

Religiosity

.282***
(.073)

Married

.238
(.200)

Education

.136*
(.059)

South

-.136
(.174)

Number of Cases
% Correctly Classified
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

644
65.22
-20.277
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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candidates. The effects of both of these factors in this election are even stronger than they were
previously in the 1992 election. Religiosity, once again, is also a significant predictor of vote
choice; however once again it cannot account for the gender gap since it is the women who are
more religious.
The death penalty, seen by some as cruel and unusual punishment, is an issue that typically
divides men and women because of its violent nature. As such, in both bivariate analyses,
women are more liberal than men in their opposition thereof (see Table 6). Blacks’ significant
gender gap in the bivariate analysis, however, disappears when controls are introduced, leaving
an insignificant model. Whites, on the other hand, retain gender gaps in both analyses. The
strength of the relationship between gender and the death penalty diminishes slightly in the
multivariate analysis, but is still healthy. For men the predicted probability of strongly favoring
the death penalty is .665, while for women it is .566 (see Table 18). This evidences a nearly tenpercent gender gap in probabilities once the other variables in the model are taken account of,
with women being more liberal than men. In addition, the predicted probability of strongly
opposing the death penalty for men is .092, while among women it is .134, showing that women
are more in opposition than men are, although generally both favor the death penalty. Of the
control variables that help explain the initial gender gap, religiosity has the greatest effect, as the
most religious are also among the most likely to oppose capital punishment. Besides religiosity,
income is also significant as those with least income are also more likely to oppose the death
penalty. Education, while related to death penalty attitudes, is not responsible for the gap.
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TABLE 6-Ologit Coefficients for Opposition to the Death Penalty
Black

White

Bivariate Coefficient

.363**
(.139)

.445***
(.111)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

752
.009
-.222
.0089

1343
.012
-8.926
.0001

Model
Insignificant

.421**
(.142)

Multivariate Model
Female
Age

-.004
(.004)

Income

-.070*
(.031)

Religiosity

.179**
(.059)

Married

-.220
(.165)

Education

.112*
(.048)

South

-.105
(.140)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

871
.041
10.889
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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Defense spending is something that is seen as taking funds away from domestic spending
programs. As such there is no gender gap among blacks in either the bivariate or multivariate
analysis, as both black men and women benefit disproportionately from the social programs that
military spending detracts from (see Table 7). Whites, however do exhibit a gender gap in both
analyses, as white women are known to profit from these social programs more so than white
men. Among whites, women have a predicted probability of .349, while men have only a .265
predicted probability of wanting such a decrease (see Table 18). In fact, once the control
variables are introduced, the coefficient for gender actually goes up, indicating that the gender
gap was being minimized by the lack of a control for other variables. Although blacks do not
have a gender gap, whereas whites do, a similar pattern can be seen among both races as the
same control variables affect both blacks and whites in the same way. Among both blacks and
whites, while unrelated to the gender gap, it is the most educated and those who live outside the
south who are more likely to favor a decrease in defense spending. In addition, among whites
age also plays a role in attitudes as those who are younger are also more likely to favor a
decrease.
Crime reduction is another issue that divides whites along gender lines, but not blacks.
Blacks have no gender gap in the analysis as men and women have similar opinions on how to
best to reduce crime (see Table 8). The major lines of division among blacks come in the areas
of income, education, and age as those with higher incomes and the most education favor
addressing social problems as the best way to deal with crime, while older blacks favor catching,
convicting, and punishing criminals. Whites, on the other hand, do have an observable gender
gap in both analyses that once again increases when other variables are controlled for. Women
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TABLE 7-Ologit Coefficients for Decreasing Defense Spending
Black
Bivariate Coefficient

Model
Insignificant

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

Multivariate Model
Female

White
.335***
(.101)
1335
.008
-3.820
.0009

-.029
(.156)

.404**
(.131)

Age

-.007
(.005)

-.012**
(.004)

Income

.056a
(.034)

-.016
(.028)

Religiosity

-.114a
(.061)

-.095a
(.053)

Married

-.092
(.164)

-.151
(.152)

Education

.188***
(.056)

.146***
(.045)

South

-.332*
(.153)

-.412**
(.131)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

691
.067
4.269
.0000

871
.052
.906
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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TABLE 8-OLS Regression Coefficients for Catching, Convicting, and Punishing Criminals

Bivariate Coefficient

Black

White

Model
Insignificant

-.208*
(.104)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

Multivariate Model
Female

.002
1466
.0456

.216
(.163)

-.306*
(.131)

Age

.013*
(.006)

.002
(.004)

Income

-.062a
(.034)

.009
(.029)

Religiosity

.044
(.062)

.023
(.054)

Married

.162
(.174)

.224
(.151)

Education

-.427***
(.060)

-.260***
(.045)

South

.221
(.157)

.423***
(.129)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0944
892
.0000

.0519
949
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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have a predicted value of 4.393, while men have a predicted value of 4.693 on the 7-point crime
reduction scale when other variables are held at their means, indicating that women are more
liberal on this issue in their greater support for addressing social problems (see Table 18). As
among blacks, education has a similar impact among whites: more education leads to a more
liberal perspective. In addition, region also has an effect among whites, as those who live
outside the south are more likely to favor the more liberal option, although neither of these
variables are related to the gender gap.
The role of government in guaranteeing a job and good standard of living is at the heart of the
liberal-conservative dichotomy. Liberal ideology leads its believers to favor an increased role
for government in helping citizens, while the alternative, conservatism believes in a more limited
role for government. Blacks are extremely united on this issue as there is no gender gap in either
the bivariate or multivariate analysis, nor does any other significant variable emerge as a
predictor of black attitudes, which leaves a totally insignificant model (see Table 9). There
appears to be no dissension among blacks on this issue. The picture changes dramatically when
white attitudes are examined, as there is a significant gender gap here. The predicted mean for
women is 4.418 when other variables are held at their means, while that for men is 4.747,
indicating that women are more liberal than men in their belief of a role for government in this
area (see Table 18). The strength of the relationship between gender and governmental
involvement weakens somewhat in the multivariate analysis, but remains significant. Those who
have lower incomes, who also tend to be women, are more in favor of governmental
intervention, and this is what causes the weakening of the original bivariate relationship. Age,
too, is related to opinions about the size of government as younger citizens are more in favor of
an increased role for government.
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TABLE 9-OLS Regressions for Government Letting Each Person Get Ahead On Own
Black
Bivariate Coefficient

Model
Insignificant

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

Multivariate Model
Female

White
-.449***
(.093)
.0158
1403
.0000

Model
Insignificant

-.326**
(.117)

Age

.009**
(.003)

Income

.106***
(.026)

Religiosity

.045
(.048)

Married

.050
(.137)

Education

.044
(.040)

South

-.124
(.115)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0603
902
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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Welfare reform is a notoriously conservative issue and as such it might be expected to cause a
gender gap. However, the results indicate no observable gender gap among either race (see
Table 10). Interestingly enough the results are nearly identical for blacks and whites in their
respective multivariate models, a first and only for this study. Both age and income are
significant and have similar negative coefficients among blacks and whites. For both races,
those who are older and have higher incomes are more likely to favor reform, such that a woman
on welfare would no longer receive an increase in her benefits if she were to have another child.
Spending for Food Stamps is yet another issue that does not divide blacks along gender lines.
Both black men and women feel similarly on this issue, and as such no gender gap is observed
(see Table 11). Blacks are, however, divided along income lines as those who have the highest
incomes are the most likely to favor a decrease in spending. Whites exhibit a significant gender
gap in the bivariate analysis, with women more likely to favor an increase in spending. This
relationship disappears though once the controls are added. With the added controls, gender
ceases to be a predictor of white attitudes on the issue of spending on Food Stamps. The
bivariate relationship appears to be a product of the high significance of income, as it is the only
significant variable in the multivariate model and wipes out the initial significance of the gender
variable. Those with the lowest incomes are the ones who most want an increase in spending.
This, as a result, appears to be the case as those with the lowest incomes tend to be women, thus
producing the original bivariate relationship.

57

TABLE 10-Ologit Coefficients for Opposition to Welfare Reform
Black

White

Model
Insignificant

Model
Insignificant

-.185
(.156)

-.138
(.134)

Age

-.014**
(.005)

-.011**
(.004)

Income

-.081*
(.033)

-.070*
(.029)

Religiosity

-.012
(.059)

-.010
(.055)

Married

-.012
(.165)

-.146
(.154)

Education

.009
(.055)

.030
(.046)

South

-.259a
(.152)

-.065
(.133)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

644
.027
27.754
.0143

862
.020
29.795
.0143

Bivariate Coefficient
Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

Multivariate Model
Female

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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TABLE 11-Ologit Coefficients for Decreasing Spending on Food Stamps

Bivariate Coefficient

Black

White

Model
Insignificant

-.277**
(.099)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

1520
.005
-.517
.0051

Multivariate Model
Female

.097
(.161)

.039
(.130)

Age

-.004
(.005)

.006
(.004)

Income

.076*
(.035)

.167***
(.029)

Religiosity

.071
(.062)

.026
(.053)

Married

.033
(.169)

.061
(.150)

Education

.030
(.057)

.015
(.044)

South

.268a
(.159)

.078
(.128)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

691
.024
31.605
.0484

984
.061
-13.650
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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Findings about government aid to blacks parallel those for spending on Food Stamps. Blacks
once again do not exhibit a gender gap on this issue (see Table 12). The only cleavage that exists
among blacks is on the lines of education; those with the least education are more likely to favor
aid to blacks. Whites, on the other hand, exhibit a gender gap in the bivariate results, with
women more liberal and in favor of such aid than are men. The multivariate model, however,
shows a similar picture to that for Food Stamps. In the presence of control variables, the
relationship between gender and aid to blacks disappears, and once again income becomes the
most significant predictor of white attitudes, as women tend to earn less than men. Those with
the lowest incomes favor aid to blacks most, while in this instance marital status also emerges
with predictive power as the unmarried favor aid to blacks more so than their married
counterparts.
Attitudes toward laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination show no significant gender
gap among blacks (see Table 13). The distinctions to be drawn among blacks come from
differences in religiosity and education. The less frequently one attends religious services, and
the more education one has, the more supportive of anti-discrimination laws one tends to be.
Whites, in contrast, have a powerful gender gap that not only survives the multivariate analysis,
but becomes enhanced by it. When the multivariate model is run the gender gap increases by an
estimated one and one-half points to an impressive .125 gap in the predicted probability of
favoring such laws, with the predicted probability for women being .423, while the same figure
for men is .298 (see Table 18). As is the case with blacks, among whites, religiosity also has a
significant impact, as the least frequent church attenders once again are most likely to favor such
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TABLE 12-OLS Regressions for Government Allowing Blacks to Get Ahead on Their
Own
Black
Bivariate Coefficient

White

Model
Insignificant

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

Multivariate Model
Female

-.297***
(.086)
.0078
1411
.0005

-.015
(.164)

-.154
(.107)

Age

.008
(.006)

.001
(.003)

Income

.037
(.035)

.064**
(.023)

Religiosity

-.053
(.062)

-.037
(.044)

Married

.174
(.172)

.249*
(.124)

Education

-.153**
(.059)

-.072a
(.037)

South

.158
(.159)

.097
(.106)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0068
749
.0996

.0223
909
.0003

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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TABLE 13-OLogit Coefficients for Opposition to Laws to Protect Homosexuals from
Discrimination
Homosexual Job Discrimination
Bivariate Coefficient

Black
Model
Insignificant

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

White
-.429***
(.102)
1300
.014
-10.663
.0000

Multivariate Model
Female

-.233
(.163)

-.546***
(.131)

Age

-.002
(.005)

.003
(.004)

Income

-.043
(.035)

.021
(.029)

Religiosity

.255***
(.064)

.146**
(.055)

Married

-.167
(.175)

.266a
(.152)

Education

-.181**
(.060)

-.067
(.045)

South

.274a
(.161)

.243a
(.130)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

623
.065
3.457
.0000

843
.046
7.419
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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laws. As men tend to be less religious than women, this explains the increased gender gap
among whites when control variables are added.
The women’s movement with its similar theme of empowering those who have historically
been discriminated against finds that blacks and whites have gender gaps, and in both cases it is
the women who feel more warmly towards the women’s movement in the bivariate analysis (see
Table 14). Adding the control variables to the analysis produces an insignificant multivariate
model for blacks, as these extra variables are unrelated to feelings about the women’s movement.
The gender gap among whites is reduced by half once the control variables are included from a
margin of 5.844 points to a margin of 2.921 points, and the predicted mean predicted for women
on the feeling thermometer is 62.908, while that for men is 60.008. Indeed, both religiosity and
region have stronger impacts on one’s feelings towards the women’s movement. Religiosity’s
coefficient of -3.219, shows that the more one attends religious services, the more negatively one
feels toward the women’s movement. Age and income also are significant as those who are
younger and have lower incomes are more supportive of the liberation of women. Also,
surprisingly and counter to expectations, living in the South produces an increase in one’s
warmth towards the women’s movement of 4.269 points. Income, however, is the only variable
that can be said to account for the first observed gender gap.
Because of the counterintuitive findings regarding feelings toward the women’s movement,
that Southerners tend to feel more warmly towards the women’s movement than nonSoutherners, a second analysis was conducted whereby instead of using actual feeling
thermometer scores, a relative feeling thermometer scale was created.3 This was done to account
for response bias among respondents who may be inclined to give all groups either high ratings
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TABLE 14-OLS Regression Coefficients for Actual Feeling Thermometer Scores for the
Women’s Movement
Black

White

Bivariate Coefficient

4.010*
(1.760)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0052
808
.0230

.0180
1348
.0000

Model
Insignificant

2.921*
(1.479)

Multivariate Model
Female

5.844***
(1.154)

Age

-.094*
(.044)

Income

-.705*
(.323)

Religiosity

-3.219***
(.609)

Married

-2.979a
(1.715)

Education

-.984a
(.504)

South

4.269**
(1.462)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0871
878
.0000

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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or low ratings, thereby disguising their true feelings about the women’s movement when
compared to these other groups. The findings here show that among both blacks and whites in
the bivariate analysis women are still significantly more inclined to rate the movement positively
than men (see Table 15). However, the multivariate analyses change and require further analysis
when relative feeling thermometer scores are substituted for actual thermometer scores.
Whereas in the previous analysis, the multivariate model for blacks was insignificant, the model
now approaches significance to where it can be interpreted and as a result, thought to represent
the actual population from which the sample was drawn. In this model for blacks gender
remains the only variable that is significantly related to one’s feelings about the women’s
movement and has a similar coefficient to the one in the bivariate model with black women
feeling more warmly than black men, showing that the introduction of the control variables does
nothing to reduce the strength of the original relationship. Whites, too, show a difference across
multivariate models. In the previous model, gender, age, income, religiosity, and region were all
significantly related to feelings toward the women’s movement. In this model the relationship
between gender and feelings toward the women’s movement becomes insignificant and the only
variables related are age and religiosity. Younger respondents and those among the least
religious are more likely to feel warmly towards the women’s movement and because neither of
these can account for the gender gap, this is a true difference between white men and women.
Region is no longer a significant predictor of whites’ feelings toward the women’s movement.
Perhaps this is a more accurate estimation of the variables that are correlated with feelings
toward the women’s movement.
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TABLE 15-OLS Regression Coefficients for Relative Feeling Thermometer Scores for
the Women’s Movement
Black

White

Bivariate Coefficient

.081*
(.036)

.056**
(.020)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0048
809
.0273

.0051
1349
.0050

.084*
(.041)

.040
(.025)

Age

-.002
(.001)

-.002*
(.001)

Income

-.007
(.009)

-.001
(.005)

Religiosity

-.003
(.016)

-.078***
(.010)

Married

-.031
(.043)

-.045
(.029)

Education

-.002
(.014)

.004
(.008)

South

-.053
(.040)

.015
(.024)

Adjusted R-squared
Number of Cases
Probability of F

.0082
674
.0864

.0806
879
.0000

Multivariate Model
Female

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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Immigration is considered to be something that threatens natural-born Americans’ job
security and cultural life. Potential evidence of this was seen in the bivariate crosstabulation in
the previous section as only small percentages of blacks and whites were found to prefer an
increase in the number of allowable immigrants (Table 1n) In spite of this, however, a
marginally significant gender gap emerges in the bivariate regression for blacks, although none is
to be found among whites (see Table 16). The gender gap among blacks indicates that it is the
women who are surprisingly most opposed to an increase in the allowable number of
immigrants, instead of the men. Perhaps black men welcome the introduction of more minorities
into America in order to bind with them in wresting power away from whites. Again, as in the
case of the women’s movement, the multivariate model for blacks is insignificant, as a result of
the introduction of control variables, which are unrelated to this immigration policy. Whites
have no gender gap at all on this issue. The only variable that appears to have an impact on
white attitudes is education, with the more educated in favor of increasingly opening our national
borders to those who come from elsewhere.
Allowing new immigrants to receive government services when they arrive in the land of
opportunity causes no disagreement among men and women of either race. No gender gap at all
emerges on this issue, as both men and women, black and white, prefer that immigrants wait at
least a year before collecting benefits (see Table 17). No variable has predictive power among
blacks as both the bivariate and multivariate models are insignificant. The multivariate model
for whites, itself only marginally significant, produces two variables of interest: age and income.
Again, only marginally significant, the trend is for those who are older and have higher incomes
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TABLE 16-Ologit Coefficients for Decreasing the Number of Immigrants Permitted to Come to
the U.S.
Black

White

Bivariate Coefficient

.238a
(.136)

Model
Insignificant

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

802
.004
3.640
.0809

Multivariate Model
Female

Model
Insignificant

.113
(.128)

Age

.006
(.004)

Income

.012
(.028)

Religiosity

-.073
(.053)

Married

.087
(.148)

Education

-.152***
(.044)

South

.171
(.128)

Number of Cases
Craig and Uhler’s R-squared
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

883
.026
23.838
.0013

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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TABLE 17-Logit Coefficients for Making Immigrants Wait at Least a Year for
Government Services

Bivariate Coefficient
Number of Cases
% Correctly Classified
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

Multivariate Model
Female

Black

White

Model
Insignificant

Model
Insignificant

Model
Insignificant

-.150
(.216)

Age

.012a
(.006)

Income

.086a
(.046)

Religiosity

-.030
(.088)

Married

.215
(.244)

Education

-.079
(.072)

South

.056
(.209)

Number of Cases
% Correctly Classified
BIC’
Probability of Chi-squared

878
87.24
35.131
.0907

a

p<.1; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001
Note: see appendix for coding scheme
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to be more in favor of making immigrants wait to reap the goods of America than are those who
younger and have lower incomes.
Once again the basic hypotheses are confirmed; there is a larger, more pronounced gender gap
among whites than there is among blacks. Among whites, women are more liberal on a variety
of issues and in their general ideology than are men. Previous studies indicating that among
whites, women tend to be and vote more Democratic than men need to be re-evaluated, based
upon the results presented here. While there is a partisan gender gap among whites, the cause of
this gap is apparently due to other factors, primarily income, that distinguish women from men.
It is these factors that lead to the observed gender gap in partisanship and vote choice among
whites, not gender, per se. Blacks, on the other hand, while not having any significant
ideological differences between men and women, do exhibit a gender gap in party identification,
with women more likely to be Democratic than men. This is not to say that blacks will not
develop a cleavage amongst themselves along gender lines in the future, however. Some gaps
among the control variables are occurring and as time goes on, blacks may also fracture along
the great gender divide, particularly as the nation moves forward and addresses the racism
concerns that continue to by and large bind the black community together.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion

Conclusion
Black unity expresses itself quite clearly throughout this study, as there are significantly
fewer gender gaps among blacks than for whites. Whites generally have larger and more
significant gender gaps than do blacks. On issues in which there was a gender gap, with only
one exception, it was the women of both races who were more liberal than the men. This
comports well with the previous research conducted on the gender gap, including the limited
research conducted on blacks and the gender gap, which has found significant gender gaps
among whites, but has had only limited success in finding similar results for blacks. The two
main surprises of this research were finding that white women are not significantly more likely
to be and vote more Democratic than white men in the face of statistical controls, and that higher
income affects blacks and whites differently in their 1992 presidential vote choice, leading
blacks to vote more Democratic and whites to vote more Republican.
The Gender Gap among Whites
The bivariate results show significant gender gaps among whites in the areas of party
identification, ideology, presidential vote choice, and a host of political issue attitudes including
traditional use of force, social service program, and minority rights issues. Women are more
Democratic, and more liberal generally and specifically on the issues of death penalty, defense
spending, crime reduction, government guarantee of a job and good standard of living,
government aid to blacks, federal spending on Food Stamps, laws to protect homosexuals from
job discrimination, and actual and relative feelings toward the women’s movement. In contrast,
there are no issues on which men are more liberal than women. On the issues of welfare reform

71

and immigration policy there exists no significant gender gap, indicating that there still do
remain some issues on which no gender gap has emerged among whites.
The multivariate results for whites show that the majority of these original bivariate
relationships do hold up with the addition of control variables that had the possibility of altering
the significance of these relationships. In only one instance did the bivariate relationship retain
roughly the same strength in multivariate analysis as was originally observed. This was for the
case of ideology. The relationship between gender and ideology retains its original strength,
with women more liberal than men. The suspected reason for this is because religiosity and
education are also significant predictors of ideology among whites, and these apparently cancel
each other out, as women’s greater religiosity and lesser educational levels, simultaneously pull
women in two different directions.
There were some issues in which the addition of control variables decreased the strength of
the original bivariate relationships. On the issues of death penalty, government guarantee of a
job and good standard of living, and actual feeling thermometer for the women’s movement,
decreases were noted in the strength of the original bivariate relationships. For these issues, it
appears that gender was covering up for some differences that were due to other factors. Each of
these issues have different control variables that are related to attitudes toward them, but the
common thread among the three, and what seems to be causing the strength of the original
relationships to decrease, is income. As women have lower incomes than do men, it is not
surprising that for each of these issues, income is positively related to giving a conservative
response, thereby making women seem more liberal when income is not taken into account.
Indeed in running each of these three multivariate models again, this time excluding income, the
strength of the relationship between gender and each issue increases. This confirms that

72

differentials in the earnings of men and women are part of what is driving the gender gap on
these issues.
In addition there were also three issues in which the addition of control variables increased
the strength of the original bivariate relationships. For defense spending, crime reduction, and
laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination, increases were noted in the strength of the
relationship between gender and each issue. For these issues, it appears that not including the
control variables masked some of the gender differences in attitudes. Once again, each of these
issues has different control variables that are related to attitudes toward them. Additional
multivariate models were run, dropping individual control variables, in an attempt to determine
which one was responsible for causing the increase in the strength of the original relationship,
and the results were inconclusive. In these instances it must be an undetermined combination of
controls that is allowing gender to exert a more powerful effect on the issues in question.
In instances where gender became an insignificant predictor of attitudes after adding controls,
there were in each case different control variables at work. Of these control variables, income,
when significant, is consistently behind the original bivariate relationships and helps account for
the gender gap among white men and women. Education, when significant, tends to have mixed
results, as more education tends to lead to liberal attitudes in specific issue areas, while at the
same time leading to more Republicanism, conservatism, and pro-Republican voting behavior.
Although women are more religious than men, religiosity, in contrast, leads to Republican voting
behavior, and a conservative ideology both in general and on specific issues, with the sole
exception of death penalty attitudes. In these circumstances, it appears that the different ways
that the control variables affect both men’s and women’s lives are the true reasons behind of
each bivariate gender gap. For the issues of party identification, presidential vote choice,

73

government aid to blacks, and federal spending on Food Stamps, gender, while a significant
predictor of attitudes in the bivariate analysis, ceases to be so in the multivariate models for each
issue.
The literature on the gender gap frequently touts that women are more likely to be Democratic
than men. While this is true in the initial bivariate analysis, once controls are introduced, the
results suggest that the gender gap is attributable to social differences in women’s and men’s
lives rather than to some inherent difference between the sexes. It is more likely that
differentials in income and education are at the root of this gap. The fact that women are more
likely to have both lower incomes and less education than men, and these characteristics are
positively associated with self-identifying as a Democrat may be two things contributing to the
bivariate gender gap. The other pertinent variable, religiosity, is less clear as women tend to be
more religious and this is positively related to self-identifying as a Republican, which women are
not more likely to call themselves. It appears that income and education exert a stronger pull on
women in the Democratic direction than the effects of religiosity in their pulling of women in the
Republican direction.
Women are also well known in the literature for their greater support of Democratic
candidates for office, particularly the presidency, than men. The bivariate analysis and actual
vote count following our every-four-year trip to the polls bear this out. The multivariate
analysis, however, shows a contradictory story, as gender is no longer a significant predictor of
presidential vote choice, once the control variables are introduced. Income again becomes a
significant predictor of vote choice, and pulls women in the same direction as it did for party
identification: toward the Democrats. Again, the most religious were also the most likely to vote
Republican, and in the case of the 1996 election, the most educated also voted more Republican.

74

Income again, may be pulling harder and influencing women’s partisan choices, more so than the
other significant variables.
Federal spending on Food Stamps and government aid to blacks, two issues that drum up
images of government helping those whom conservatives believe should be helping themselves,
are issues in which women’s more liberal stance disappears once controls are added. It is the
familiar effect of income that lies behind the gender gaps on these two issues also. Higher
incomes are significantly related to having conservative opinions on many issues, particularly
those that involve giving aid to a subset of the population. This is undoubtedly the result of the
resentment that many higher income citizens, who are, once again, more often men, feel toward
subsidizing these groups through the higher tax burden that they must carry. Also, in the case of
aid to blacks, marital status has a significant effect, with those who are married also holding
conservative attitudes on this issue, believing that blacks should help themselves.
While the relationship between gender and actual feelings toward the women’s movement
remains significant in both the bivariate and multivariate analyses, in the case of relative feelings
toward the movement, the relationship loses its original bivariate significance in the multivariate
analysis. The variables most related to these relative feelings are age and religiosity. Older
citizens and those who are most religious tend to feel more coldly towards the women’s
movement than those who are younger and less religious. These results are odd because women
are both more religious and tend to live to older ages than do men, and yet both are correlated
with feeling more coldly, so these control variables cannot be masking women’s more liberal
feelings in the bivariate analysis, because both are associated with more conservative feelings
toward the women’s movement.
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The Gender Gap among Blacks
Among blacks, the bivariate results, for the most part, show an absence of gender gaps, in
striking contrast to whites, who exhibited gender gaps on most issues in this analysis. Black men
and women tend to feel similarly on the majority of issues in this study. The only issues in
which a significant gender gap was observed were party identification, death penalty, and actual
and relative feelings toward the women’s movement, in addition to a borderline significant
relationship between gender and the number of immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. On
these issues it is the women who are the more liberal, with the exception of the number of
immigrants permitted to come to the U.S. In this particular instance black men are more liberal
than black women and are more in favor of increasing the allowable number of immigrants. This
confirms the limited findings establishing a lack of a gender gap among blacks when compared
to whites and shows that blacks are more united along gender lines than are whites on the major
issues of the day.
The multivariate analyses conducted among blacks show that in the face of additional control
variables, the majority of these bivariate relationships do not hold up. As was the case with the
white sample, there are other variables underlying the original perceived gender gaps on these
issues. The only issue in which the original bivariate relationship remained significant was that
of party identification. Black women remain significantly more likely to be Democratic than
black men, even when the controls are added, in sharp contrast to what was observed for whites.
However, it is not the case that men are more likely to self-identify as Republican than women
are. Rather black women’s attachment to the Democratic party is stronger than the attachment
felt to the Democratic party by black men, as both are nearly equally likely to call themselves
some measure or form of Democrats, with men slightly more likely to call themselves
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Independents. The remaining original significant relationships no longer exist once examined
using a multivariate model; the models become insignificant and as a result unable to be
interpreted
While the relationship between gender and actual feelings toward the women’s movement
loses its significance in the multivariate model due to the inclusion of control variables, the
relationship between gender and relative feelings toward the women’s movement approaches
significance, and is close enough to have interpretable results. In contrast to the identical model
for whites, which sees gender losing its significance, in the model for blacks, gender retains its
significance and is the only variable to do so, with women feeling more warmly than men. This
contrasts sharply with the results for whites, which not only found gender to be insignificant, but
also found age and religiosity to be significant predictors.
As mentioned, the bivariate results, for the most part, show an absence of gender gaps.
However, this is not to say that blacks are a monolithically unified group. Even in the absence of
a large number of gender gaps, as demonstrated for whites, there are indeed areas in which
blacks are becoming more diverse in their opinions and attitudes, like whites. Of the 16
multivariate models run, while only two have significant gender gaps, a total of eight of the
models show emerging cleavages among blacks that are unrelated to gender.
The most prominent of the gaps occurring in five of those eight cases and worth mentioning is
along the lines of education. In the areas of ideology, defense spending, crime reduction,
government aid to blacks, and laws to protect homosexuals from discrimination, there are
significant gaps among blacks based on their educational level. As is usually the case among
whites, for blacks, having an increased level of education produces significantly more liberal
attitudes on these issues and undoubtedly others not analyzed in this study. As such, the future
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events of this may lead to, down the road, more observable and prominent gender gaps among
blacks. This may become the case because while white women are outpacing white men at every
educational level, except the doctoral, thus having a liberalizing effect on them, among blacks,
black women even farther outpace black men at every educational level, including the doctoral.
This should increase black women’s liberalism when compared with black men, and as a result
may increase gender differences in social and political attitudes among blacks.
Implications
All indications are that the gender gap among whites is a stable American phenomenon that
will continue to influence the way that politics are conducted and experienced in the United
States. Because politics and the issues are experienced differently by men and women, the two
parties will have to continue to tailor their political messages to the demographic group that is
most receptive of and responsive to them. However, among blacks the lack of a clear gender gap
attests to their unity on the issues. The results in this study indicate that blacks are still solidly in
the Democratic fold and that this is not necessarily a product of blacks’ agreement with the
Democratic party platform. Blacks do exhibit ideological cleavages on some of the issues
examined, but because of the Republican party’s past and continuing hostility toward public
policies of interest to black Americans, the Democratic party is able to take advantage of the
situation and effectively make blacks an electorally captured group (see Frymer 1999), thereby
limiting the real choices of blacks in the political arena.
Future research should include more issues that have great importance in this day and age, but
which could not be included in this study, as they were not asked of respondents in both surveys.
These include those that inquire of respondents’ attitudes towards gun control, and abortion, two
very divisive issues of the day. It is more likely that there are significant relationships between
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these and gender, especially among blacks, on these issues. Such were the findings of a previous
study conducted by myself, which because of a much smaller sample of blacks than that used
here, could not produce acceptable levels of statistical significance, at least in the case of
abortion. In addition, it would also be prudent to examine other election returns, in particular
those for senatorial and congressional elections and perhaps local and state elections to see if
gender gaps happen to emerge in these races that can withstand the addition of control variables.
It may be the case that there is something particular to presidential elections, or even to Bill
Clinton and Al Gore that would not be the case in more localized elections, or even presidential
elections without these two particular candidates. In addition, it would be useful to assess how
much guidance and direction each demographic variable provides in constructing the political
attitudes of men and women of both races. Also, the surveys used for this study are somewhat
dated (1996), so now in the year 2005 there may be more or different gender gaps among both
blacks and whites. The events of September 11th, 2001 may have altered Americans’ views of
defense spending and immigration policy, so therefore more recent data should be used to assess
this. In addition, more recent data with blacks would help determine if blacks’ unity is breaking
down, thereby allowing different subgroups of the black population to become more concerned
with non-racial issues, which may lead to differences of opinion, resulting in additional gender
gaps.

End Notes
1. The American National Election Study provides information on the attitudes and political
preferences of the American electorate during the 1996 presidential election, and contains both
pre- and post-election components. Making use of a stratified random sample, a total of 1,714
interviews with voting-eligible Americans were conducted during the pre-election component,
1,534 of whom were reinterviewed for the post-election component. The 1996 American
National Election Study was conducted by the Center for Political Studies of the Institute for
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Social Research and distributed by the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR).
2. The National Black Election Study provides information on the attitudes and political
preferences of the Black electorate during the 1996 presidential election, and contains both preand post-election components. Making use of a stratified random sample, a total of 1,216
interviews with voting-eligible blacks were conducted during the pre-election component, 854 of
whom were reinterviewed for the post-election component. The telephone survey was carried
out by Market Strategies in Southfield, Michigan and distributed by the Inter-university
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR)
3. The relative feeling thermometer score was calculated by finding each respondent’s personal
mean for all groups that appear across studies (the military, the federal government, blacks,
whites, labor unions, big business, people on welfare, Hispanics, Christian fundamentalists, gay
men and lesbians, and the Christian Coalition), subtracting it from their score for the women’s
movement, and dividing this by their personal mean [(score-mean)/mean].
4. The data for the NBES are weighted, except in the Logit and Ologit analyses, because of the
difficulty of using weighted data in Stata.
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Appendix

Exact Question Wording for Whites (NES) and Blacks (NBES) and Coding Information
Party Identification
NES--Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or to the Democratic Party?
NBES--Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or what?
Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?
Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?
Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican Party or the Democratic Party?
Coded 1= strong Democrat to 7= strong Republican
Ideology
NES--We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a seven-point
scale on which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to
extremely conservative.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
NBES--In general, when it comes to politics, do you usually think of yourself as a liberal, a
conservative, a moderate or what?
Do you think of yourself as a strong liberal or a not very strong liberal?
Do you think of yourself as a strong conservative or a not very strong conservative?
Do you think of yourself as more like a liberal or more like a conservative?
Coded 1= extremely liberal to 7= extremely conservative
1992 Presidential Election
NES--In 1992 George Bush ran on the Republican ticket against Bill Clinton for the Democrats,
and Ross Perot as an independent candidate. Do you remember for sure whether or not you
voted in that election?
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Which one did you vote for? (If voted for president in1992)
NBES--In 1992, George Bush ran on the Republican ticket against the Independent Ross Perot,
and against Bill Clinton for the Democrats. Do you remember for sure whether or not you voted
in that election?
Which one did you vote for? (If voted for president in 1992)
Coded 0= Bush, 1= Clinton, Perot was dropped from the analysis
1996 Presidential Election
NES--If R voted for candidate for president in 1996: Who did you vote for?
NBES--In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to
vote because they weren’t registered, they were sick, or they just didn’t have time. How about
you--did you vote in the elections this November?
How about the election for President? Did you vote for a candidate for President?
Who did you vote for? (If voted for president in 1996)
Coded 0= Clinton, 1= Dole, Perot was dropped from the analysis
Death Penalty
NES--Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
Do you favor/oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not strongly?
NBES--Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?
Do you favor/oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder strongly or not strongly?
Coded 1= favor strongly, 2= favor not strongly, 3= oppose not strongly, 4= oppose strongly
Defense Spending
NES--Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Suppose these
people are at one end of a scale, at point 1. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly
increased. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. And, of course, some other
people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
NBES--Should federal spending on military and defense be increased, decreased, or kept about
the same?
NES data recoded to match NBES data where 1= increased, 2= kept about the same, 3=
decreased
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Seven Point Crime Reduction Scale
NES--Some people say that the best way to reduce crime is to address the social problems that
cause crime, like bad schools, poverty and joblessness. (Suppose these people are at one end of a
scale, at point 1.) Other people say the best way to reduce crime is to make sure that criminals
are caught, convicted and punished. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.)
And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points 2,3,4,5 or 6.
Where would you place yourself on this scale or haven't you thought much about this?
NBES--Some people say the best way to reduce crime is to address the social problems that
cause crime, like bad schools, poverty and joblessness. Suppose these people are at one end of a
scale, at point 1. Other people say the best way to reduce crime is to make sure that criminals are
caught, convicted, and punished. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. (And, of
course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points, 2,3,4,5, or 6.)
Where would you place yourself on this scale?
Coded as stated in questions
Job and Good Standard of Living
NES--Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a
job and a good standard of living (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.)
Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. (Suppose these
people are at the other end, at point 7.) And, of course, some other people have opinions
somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
NBES--Some people feel the government in Washington should see to it that every person has a
job and a good standard of living. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at point 1.
Others think the government should just let each person get ahead on their own. Suppose these
people are at the other end, at point 7. (And, of course, some other people have opinions
somewhere in between at points, 2,3,4,5, or 6.)
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about it?
Coded as stated in questions
Welfare Reform
NES--Some people have proposed that a woman on welfare who has another child not be given
an increase in her welfare check. Do you favor or oppose this change in welfare policy?
Do you favor/oppose this change strongly or not strongly?
NBES--Some people propose that a woman on welfare who has another child not be given an
increase in her welfare check. Do you favor or oppose this change in welfare policy?
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Do you favor/oppose this change strongly or not strongly?
Coded 1= favor strongly, 2= favor not strongly, 3= oppose not strongly, 4= oppose strongly
Federal Spending on Food Stamps
NES--Should Federal Spending on food stamps be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
NBES--Should federal spending on food stamps be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?
Coded 1= increased, 2= kept about the same, 3= decreased; those who volunteered in the NES
that spending should be cut out entirely were coded as decreased.
Government aid to Blacks
NES--Some people feel that the government in Washington should make every effort to improve
the social and economic position of blacks. (Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at
point 1.) Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help blacks
because they should help themselves. (Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.)
And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between, at points 2,3,4,5, or 6.
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
NBES--Some people feel the government in Washington should make every effort to improve
the social and economic position of Blacks. Suppose these people are at one end of a scale, at
point 1. Others feel that the government should not make any special effort to help Blacks
because they should help themselves. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7.
(And, of course, some other people have opinions somewhere in between at points, 2,3,4,5, or 6.)
Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?
Coded as stated in questions
Homosexual Job Discrimination
NES--Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?
Do you favor/oppose such laws strongly or not strongly?
NBES--Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination?
Do you favor/oppose such laws strongly or not strongly?
Coded 1= favor strongly, 2= favor not strongly, 3= oppose not strongly, 4= oppose strongly
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Rating the Women’s Movement
NES--I'd like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are
in the news these days. I'll read the name of a person and I'd like you to rate that person using
something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean
that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees
mean that you don't feel favorable toward that person and that you don't care too much for that
person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don't feel particular warm or
cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don't recognize, you don't need
to rate that person. Just tell me and we'll move on to the next one.
How would you rate the women’s movement?
NBES--Now I’d like to get your feelings toward some of your political leaders and other people,
events, and organizations that have been in the news. I’ll read the name of a person, event, or
organization and I’d like you to rate it using something called the feeling thermometer. You can
choose any number between 0 and 100. The higher the number, the warmer or more favorable
you feel toward that person, event, or organization; the lower the number, the colder or less
favorable. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you feel neither warm nor cold
toward them. If we come to a person, event, or organization whose name you don’t recognize,
you don't need to rate that person, event, or organization. Just tell me and we’ll move on to the
next one. Our first event is the women’s movement.
Coded as stated in questions
Immigrant Government Services
NES--Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they
come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, Welfare, or should they
have to be here a year or more?
NBES--Do you think that immigrants who come to the U.S. should be eligible as soon as they
come here for government services such as Medicaid, Food Stamps, and Welfare, or should they
have to be here for a year or more?
Coded 0= as soon as they come here, 1= have to be here a year or more
Number of Immigrants Permitted to Come to the U.S.
NES--Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come
to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now,
decreased a little, or decreased a lot?
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NBES--Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to
come to the United States to live should be increased a little, increased a lot, decreased a little,
decreased a lot, or left the same as it is now?
Coded 1= increased a lot, 2= increased a little, 3= left the same as it is now, 4= decreased a little,
5= decreased a lot
Age
NES--What is the month, day and year of your birth?
Month and year of R's birth was subtracted from month and year of interview. If year of birth
was NA or refused but age of respondent was given by informant in the household listing, then
age from household listing was used. Actual age= 18-96, 97= 97 years or more
NBES--Build age by subtracting the months and year from respondent’s birth from month and
year of interview. Actual age= 17-90, 91= 91 years or older
Coded intervally as stated
Income
NES--Please look at page 21 of the booklet and tell me the letter of the income group that
includes the income of all members of your family living here in 1995 before taxes. This figure
should include salaries, wages, pensions, dividends, interest, and all other income.
[If uncertain: What would be your best guess?]
1. A. None or less than $2,999
2. B. $3,000-$4,999
3. C. $5,000-$6,999
4. D. $7,000-$8,999
5. E. $9,000-$9,999
6. F. $10,000-$10,999
7. G. $11,000-$11,999
8. H. $12,000-$12,999
9. J. $13,000-$13,999
10. K. $14,000-$14.999
11. M. $15,000-$16,999
12. N. $17,000-$19,999
13. P. $20,000-$21,999
14. Q. $22,000-$24,999
15. R. $25,000-$29,999
16. S. $30,000-$34,999
17. T. $35,000-$39,999
18. U. $40,000-$44,999
19. V. $45,000-$49,999

90

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

W. $50,000-$59,999
X. $60,000-$74,999
Z. $75,000-89,999
AA. $90,000-$104,999
BB. $105,000 and over

NBES--Which of the following income croups includes the income of all members of your
family living here in 1995 before taxes? This figure should include salaries, wages, pensions,
dividends, interest, and all other income. [If uncertain: what would be your best guess?]
1. Up to $10,000
2. $10,000-$15,000 [14,999]
3. $15,000-$20,000 [19,999]
4. $20.000-525.000 [24,999]
5. $25,000-$30,000 [29,999]
6. $30,000-$40,000 [39,999]
7. $40,000-$50,000 [49,999]
8. $50,000-$75,000 [74,999]
9. $75,000-$90,000 [89,999]
10. $90,000-$105,000 [104.999]
11. $105,000 and more
NES data recoded to match NBES data
Religiosity
NES--Do you go to religious services every week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a
few times a year, or never?
NBES--Would you say you go to church or place of worship every week, almost every week,
once or twice a month, a few times a year, or never?
Coded 1= never, 2= a few times a year, 3= once or twice a month, 4= almost every week, 5=
every week
Marital Status
NES--Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife)-- or are you widowed, divorced,
separated, or have you never married?
NBES--Are you married now and living with your (husband/wife)--or are you widowed,
divorced, or separated?
Coded 0= not married, 1= married
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Education
NES--What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?
IF R HAS COMPLETED FEWER THAN 13 YEARS OF EDUCATION:
Did you get a high school diploma or pass a high school equivalency test?
IF R HAS COMPLETED MORE THAN 12 YEARS OF EDUCATION:
What is the highest degree that you have earned?
NBES--What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed? (READ
CODES l-9 ONLY If NECESSARY)
1 grade school (grades 1-8)
2 some high school, no degree (grades 9-11)
3 high school degree
4 some college, no degree
5 Associate’s/2 year degree
6 Bachelor’s/4 year degree
7 some graduate school
8 Master’s degree
9 Doctorate/Law degree
Recoded 1= least education to 7= most education
Region
NES--1996 Census Region - Interview Location
For Panel respondents, this is the region of R's interview location in 1996.
1. Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT)
2. North Central (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI)
3. South (AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV)
4. West (AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NM, NV, OR, UT, WA, WY)
NBES--Region coded from respondent’s given state of residence
Coded 0= non-South, 1= South
Gender
NES--R's sex is:
NBES--Sex of respondent (by observation)
Coded 0= male, 1= female
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